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5Introduction: the Eurasian Economic Union 
– a parallel European integration?
Following the dissolution of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), there have been various 
attempts over the past two decades by the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) to promote deep-
er economic integration; however these initiatives 
included clauses allowing member states to choose 
the depth of integration. This can be explained by the 
fact that for many countries the motive behind the 
establishment of the CIS was not in fact a search for 
a format for (re)integration, but was rather a means 
to ensure conditions for the former members of the 
USSR “to part” in an orderly manner.
The CIS trade regime basically consisted of bilater-
al trade agreements periodically supplemented with 
exemptions. Meanwhile, the multilateral agreements 
within the CIS framework generally coordinated spe-
cific issues: unification of customs procedures, rules 
for determining the origin of goods, etc. All of these 
multilateral agreements had to be ratified by national 
parliaments and this was an additional safeguard for 
those countries that were cautious regarding deeper 
integration. As a result, commitments of CIS mem-
bers under these agreements were very limited.1. 
The large number of legally non-binding bilat-
eral agreements, the systematic application of 
exemptions, and the intergovernmental nature 
of the integration determined that the CIS failed 
to evolve into a highly integrated economic en-
tity with elements of supranationalism and pre-
vented an opportunity for a political union to be 
formed within the CIS framework.
Failure to push integration under the “umbrella” 
of the CIS framework forced the (re)integration archi-
tects of the post-Soviet space (whose driving force 
has always been Russia) to rely on the “multi-speed” 
formula whereby those countries that are willing 
or motivated in various ways form a core and inte-
grate in one or another policy sector. The practical 
manifestation of such an approach is the Collective 
1 “Kodėl Ukraina negali tapti ES nare?” [Why the Ukraine 
Cannot Become an EU Member?”], analytic survey 1 (1), 2009, 
Eastern Europe Studies Centre, Centre for Eastern Geopolitical 
Studies.
Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the eco-
nomic Customs Union (CU) of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. The logic of “multi-speed” integration 
can be summarised as follows: the core countries 
deepen their mutual integration, strengthen their 
bargaining powers with respect to non-member 
states and thus encourage/force other countries 
to join a project initiated by the core. 
Unlike free trade agreements that had previ-
ously existed in the CIS, the CU of Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan launched on 1 January 2010, is a 
qualitatively different, deeper stage of integration, 
as it introduced not only a free trade area, but also 
a common import duties structure and common ex-
ternal tariff, as well as launched a harmonization of 
product quality, sanitary and other standards. On the 
other hand, CU is still not the final target of integra-
tion, because on 1 January 2012, at least formally, 
this structure entered its second stage of integra-
tion, the Common Economic Space, and the final 
goal of integration is the Eurasian Economic Union 
to will become functional in 2015. In theory, this 
three-stage integration system repeats the classic 
scheme of integration stages: from the CU to the 
common market, which operates on the basis of 
the “four freedoms”, and which then leads to the 
most integrated monetary and economic union.
Obviously, the architects of the Eurasian Economic 
Union want to create within five years what took 
almost 40 years in European Union integration pro-
cess. The question is whether this is merely a facade/
theoretical construct or whether after all it contains 
a specific content? 
Along with the process of integration, the institu-
tional architecture of the Eurasian Economic Union 
started to emerge. Its most important link is a supra-
national Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). This 
commission has the mandate of member states in 
such areas as trade policy, customs, external tariffs 
and non-tariff barriers, trade protection instruments, 
technical regulations, etc. It is planned that the EEC 
mandate in the long term (up to 2015) may expand 
to the areas of energy policy, public procurement, 
sale of services, competition and investment. It 
should be noted that the EEC architects are learning 
from the past mistakes of failed integration projects 
particularly in the area an institutional framework – 
6strengthening the legal status of decisions taken by 
supranational institutions on member states. Institu-
tional decisions will be applied directly, without any 
additional internal legislation or ratification.2
Another important question is what the relation-
ship between the EU and this supranational institu-
tion to which Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan assign 
increasingly more powers should be? What should 
the model of the EU’s relations with the Eurasian 
Economic Union (and the EEC representing it) be, 
given the negotiations of the EU with Russia for 
a new strategic agreement and the EU negotia-
tions with Kazakhstan for an enhanced Partner-
ship and Cooperation Agreement? Should the 
Eurasian Union be recognised as a legitimate 
regional bloc? And what would the implications 
of such recognition be?
 
These problematic issues are related to the broad-
er field of EU interests: what is the potential impact 
of the Eurasian Economic Union on the EU’s capac-
ity to expand the security and stability space in 
its neighbourhood, as well as on the functionality 
of the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative which 
provides for the involvement of partner countries 
in the EU’s economic integration space, and on 
the EU’s external trade policy which focuses on 
the reduction of protectionist barriers in the in-
ternational environment, etc.  
The analysis of the development model selected 
by the emerging Eurasian Economic Union should 
provide an answer to the question of (1) whether this 
is a project of natural regional economic integration 
(modelled on the EU example) which may eventu-
ally create conditions for a common economic space 
“from Lisbon to Vladivostok” or (2) whether this is an 
alternative space for integration whose relationship 
with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is problem-
atic (due to non-equal membership of the states in 
2 Rilka Dragneva and Kataryna Wolczuk, “Russia, the Eurasian 
Customs Union and the EU: Cooperation, Stagnation or 
Rivalry?”, Chatham House Briefing Paper, No. 1, 2012, 6, 
available at:
<http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/fi les/
public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0812bp_
dragnevawolczuk.pdf >.
the WTO, introduction of protectionist barriers) while 
the aim of this integration project is geopolitical: Rus-
sian efforts to limit the opportunities of post-Soviet 
states to join the EU economic integration space, to 
take over strategic sectors of the economy of these 
countries and to split Europe into two competing 
political and economic blocs. 
Thus, the objective of this study is to carry out 
an analysis of the possible impact of the emerg-
ing Eurasian Economic Union on the EU (and the 
EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative) and the Eastern 
Partnership countries and to provide recommen-
dations for EU policy with respect to the Eurasian 
Economic Union. The following are the objectives 
of this study: 
 
– to analyse the institutional architecture of the 
Eurasian Economic Union and the most important 
mandates of supranational institutions; to suggest 
an answer to the question of what the final vision 
of this economic integration project is;
– to assess the place of the Eurasian Union in Russia’s 
domestic and foreign policy. Is this yet another at-
tempt to reinforce integration within the CIS space 
or a project of new quality of supranational integra-
tion? What are the possibilities and limits of Eurasian 
Union integration? 
– to analyse the relationship between the Eurasian 
Economic Union and EU external economic policy 
and its potential effect on the EU’s Eastern Partner-
ship initiative;
– to examine political and economic risks of the 
negotiations between the EU and the Eurasian 
Economic Union as an integrated regional struc-
ture; 
– to assess the advantages and disadvantages, 
strengths and weaknesses of the project and deter-
mine potential winners and losers of the Eurasian 
Economic Union; 
– to analyse development opportunities of the 
Eurasian Economic Union, i.e. analyse the pros and 
cons (costs and benefits) of the membership of the 
Ukraine and Moldova as key targets for the expan-
sion of the Eurasian Union;
7– to assess whether the Eurasian Economic Union 
can become an instrument for Russia to control the 
relationship between the EU, as an alternative centre 
of economic integration, and the countries of the 
Eastern Neighbourhood; 
– to provide guidelines for what EU policy should 
be in respect of the Eurasian Economic Union: what 
should the EU’s response to deepening integration 
trends within the framework of the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union be? 
I. The institutional architecture of the
Eurasian CU
The development of both the Eurasian CU and 
the institutions of the emerging Eurasian Economic 
Union reflect the character of economic integration 
in the region. 
There is little doubt that integration of Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan, the development of CU, 
and the declared ambitions to deepen integration 
leading to the Eurasian Economic Union arise from 
political decisions by the heads of these states. The 
driving force of the process is the current Russian 
president, Vladimir Putin, who used to head the Rus-
sian Council of Ministers and was most adamant, par-
ticularly when speaking with representatives of third 
countries, about the launching of the Eurasian CU. 
On the other hand, the development of the Eura-
sian CU is publicly compared to voluntary delegation 
of national sovereignty under the European integra-
tion model. Yet the functioning of the institutional 
framework and the type of decision-making can 
show to what extent this process is equal and to 
what extent it is a forced integration model con-
solidating asymmetry among member states in 
decision-making. 
The most important Eurasian authority is the Su-
preme Eurasian Economic Council which acts both 
at the level of heads of states/presidents and prime 
ministers of the three member states. This institution 
determines the strategy and goals of integration. 
The practical side of the integration process of 
Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan is best reflected by 
the EEC, which formally came into being on 1 Feb-
ruary 2012 and de jure took over the functions of 
the hitherto CU Commission. The Commission was 
established on 18 November 2011. The EEC is a supra-
national, uniform, permanently operating CU institu-
tion for the emerging common economic space. Its 
main functions are to ensure the operation of the CU 
and to make proposals concerning further economic 
integration leading to the creation of the common 
economic space. In light of these goals, the list of the 
EEC’s areas of activities is long and quite ambitious:
1. Tariff and non-tariff trade regulation.
2. Customs administration.
3. Laying down mandatory standards through 
technical regulations.
4. Control of sanitary, veterinary and phyto-
sanitary measures. 
5. Collection and allocation of import duties.
6. Setting of trade regime with third countries. 
7. Collection of statistics on mutual trade and 
trade with third countries. 
8. Macroeconomic policy. 
9. Competition policy.
10. Industrial and agricultural subsidies.
11. Energy policy.
12. Natural monopolies. 
13. State and local government procurement. 
14. Mutual trade in services and investment 
regimes.
15. Transport and transportation. 
16. Currency policy.
17. Protection of intellectual property.
18. Labour migration.
19. Financial market regulation (banking, insur-
ance, foreign exchange market and stock 
markets).
The list of the EEC areas of competence above 
shows that the first seven areas are related to the 
functioning of the currently operating CU. The re-
maining areas of competence should reflect the as-
pirations of the countries to deepen their economic 
integration. One must recall that the current EEC has 
taken over the CU functions and ensures continuity 
of activities; thus the EEC activities in the areas re-
lated to the functioning of the CU have now become 
more obvious. However, even in these areas the 
influence of government authorities (ministries) 
of individual CU members (first of all Russia) is 
nonetheless noticeable. This is primarily visible 
8through the preparation of initiatives and draft 
technical regulations, application of sanitary and 
phyto-sanitary measures, and even through active 
involvement and the projects on import duties. Dur-
ing negotiations regarding the trade regime with 
third countries, conferences and other meetings on 
this subject, the most visible figure so far is that of 
Maxim Medvedkov, director of one of the depart-
ments of Russia’s Economic Development Ministry 
and the former chief negotiator for Russia’s accession 
to the WTO. 
Limited EEC activities, even in ensuring daily 
functioning of the CU, may both be due to objec-
tive reasons, such as the lack of personnel and 
expertise, and the unwillingness of CU countries, 
particularly Russia, to assign competences to the 
supranational authority. Objective reasons that 
restrict the more pro-active EEC cannot be excluded 
because, as it has been mentioned, the EEC has 
formally existed for less than a year. According to 
the decision adopted at the end of 2011 by the 
CU heads of state (Supreme Eurasian Economic 
Council), from 2012 to the beginning of 2013, EEC 
departments should employ more personnel and 
the number of employees would increase from 600 
to 1,071. 
As far as other areas of EEC competence related 
to further economic integration (movement to-
wards an economic union) rather than only ensur-
ing functioning of the CU, are concerned, there is 
no notable agenda yet, although in some of these 
areas – competition regulations, natural monopo-
lies, protection of intellectual property, and trans-
port – some sporadic decisions involving attempts 
to identify and define further activities have been 
adopted. In these areas too, the work of the EEC will 
directly depend on cooperation with institutions of 
the current CU countries and their goodwill in ex-
changing information and gradually assigning their 
competence to the supranational authority. 
The EEC consists of the Council and the Board. 
Members of both the Council and the Board are ap-
pointed by CU member states. Candidates are ap-
proved by the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council 
operating at the level of heads of state/presidents. 
They also approve the EEC rules of procedure. In ad-
dition to the Council and the Board, other structural 
units include 25 (23) departments. The treaty regard-
ing the Eurasian Economic Commission states that 
the EEC may set up its offices in CU countries, third 
countries, and at international organisations.
The EEC adopts decisions which have direct 
effect and are legally binding. The EEC may 
also adopt non-binding recommendations. EEC 
decisions take effect in 30 calendar days after their 
official publication. In cases that require immediate 
response, EEC decisions may take effect within a 
shorter time, but not earlier than 10 calendar days 
after their official publication. The Supreme Eurasian 
Economic Council may empower the Commission 
to sign international treaties that fall within the 
EEC’s competence. In this case, the power to sign 
the treaty is granted to the Chairman of the EEC 
Board and the power to negotiate is granted to 
one of the members of the EEC Board depending 
on the type of policy. EEC decisions are adopted 
by consensus in the EEC Council. Decisions in the 
EEC Board are adopted by consensus or a 2/3 
majority vote. Each member of both the Council 
and the Board has one vote. 
The EEC Council consists of deputy prime minis-
ters of the three current CU countries – Russia, Be-
larus and Kazakhstan. Belarus is represented in the 
EEC Council by Sergei Rumas, Kazakhstan – by Kairat 
Kelimbetov and Russia – by Igor Shuvalov. The main 
tasks of the EEC Council are control of common inte-
gration processes and general management of EEC 
activities. EEC Council meetings are lawful only if all 
three members of the Council take part. The Council 
Chairmanship is a rotating position and the term of 
office of the Chairman is one year. During the year 
in office, the Chairman is in charge of the agenda 
formation and preparation of issues for discussion, 
however the other two members of the Council al-
ways retain the right to initiate a Council meeting 
or propose additional issues in the planned agenda. 
Council meetings are usually attended by the Chair-
man of the EEC Board. Other members of the Board 
may also be invited.
Unlike the Board, the EEC Council adopts deci-
sions only by consensus. Should members of the 
Council fail to agree, the issue is passed to the Su-
preme Eurasian Economic Council. In addition, each 
country of the CU has the right through its member 
9of the EEC Council to withdraw or amend the deci-
sion adopted by the EEC Board within 10 calendar 
days from the date of adoption of the decision. In 
this case, within 5 calendar days, the Board provides 
all the documentation relating to the disputed is-
sue to the Council which takes a decision within 10 
calendar days. Should any of the CU countries con-
tinue to express dissatisfaction over the decision, 
the Prime Minister of that country may, within 30 
calendar days after public announcement of the 
decision, request the EEC to submit the decision on 
the repeal/amendment of a legal act for review to 
the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council. In certain 
cases, the Prime Minister of a CU country may request 
the EEC to submit the issue regarding an adopted 
decision which has not taken effect for review to the 
Supreme Eurasian Economic Council. In both cases, 
the EEC decisions will not take effect until they 
are reviewed by presidents of the countries and 
the final decision is made by consensus. 
The EEC Board is the executive body which 
prepares proposals for further development of the 
CU and economic integration of the union. The Board 
consists of nine members, one of whom chairs the 
Board. Members of the Board are nominated in equal 
proportion by each CU country (three members 
from each country). According to qualification 
requirements for the Board members, they must 
have at least seven years experience in the particular 
field in which they will be working and at least one 
year experience in the civil service of the nominating 
country. Members of the EEC Board are appointed 
for a four-year term by the decision of the Supreme 
Eurasian Economic Council (at the level of prime 
ministers). The Council (at the level of presidents) 
has the right to extend the term of office of members 
of the Board. The Chairman of the EEC Board is also 
appointed for a four-year term. Chairmanship is a 
rotating position. The status of the members of the 
Board is equal to that of the nominating country’s 
(federal) minister’s status. 
The EEC Board makes decisions, provides 
recommendations, and implements decisions by the 
Supreme Eurasian Economic Council and the EEC 
Council. Board meetings take place at least once a 
week and decisions are adopted by consensus or a 
2/3 majority vote. The functions of the Board include 
monitoring of the implementation of the treaty on 
establishment of the CU and economic union, control 
of the implementation of the decisions adopted by 
the Commission in CU countries, prepare written 
expert reports on the specific proposals received from 
institutions of CU countries, mediate between CU 
countries in resolving their disagreements, represent 
the EEC in the Court of the Eurasian Economic Union, 
prepare the draft EEC budget, and annual reporting 
to the EEC Council on the progress in the main 
areas of the implementation of the integration. The 
Board would also manage offices of the EEC in third 
countries. 
The EEC Board manages the EEC departments. 
Departmental directors and deputy directors are 
elected through open competition for a four-year 
term. Other employees of departments are also 
appointed through open competition procedures. 
The EEC rules of procedure set quotas for positions 
and employee position levels for nationals of each CU 
country. In addition, the Board establishes consulting 
bodies that include representatives from government 
institutions of CU countries. These consulting bodies 
usually prepare proposals in their respective fields 
of competence for subsequent decisions of the EEC 
Board. 
The court of the Eurasian Economic Union 
hears disputes between CU countries regarding 
implementation of legal acts. Economic entities 
of countries which dispute EEC decisions and their 
compliance with legal acts of higher legal force, 
provided such EEC decisions have negative (financial) 
consequences, also are entitled to bring a direct 
action before this court. On the other hand, there 
are many doubts as to whether this court, given 
the specific political system (business-politics 
nexus and type of political decision making) of 
the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union, 
will be able to act as an independent controlling 
body.
The rule of qualified majority voting entrenched 
in the initial phase of integration (according to which 
Russia had 57% of votes; Belarus and Kazakhstan – 
21.5% of votes each), in the course of deepening 
integration has been more frequently replaced by 
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the unanimity rule3 and this transition to unanimity 
shows the domination of intergovernmentalism. This 
seems to attest to the declining power asymmetry 
between member states (as well as entrenchment of 
the principle of equality); however changes raise the 
question of whether the structures of the suprana-
tional union are only an institutional facade for some 
member states to relocate their national interests to 
the supranational level regardless of the rules. 
Moreover, some authors argue that Russia’s agree-
ment to amend previously valid rules under which 
Russia’s vote accounted for 57% while the votes of 
Belarus and Kazakhstan accounted for 21.5% and 
give equal weights to votes is associated with in-
tentions to provide a response in advance to the 
potential concerns of the Ukrainian government 
regarding restrictions of sovereignty by accessing 
the Eurasian Union.4
Summing up, it is doubtful that member states of 
the Eurasian CU, which in their domestic and foreign 
politics rely on the provisions of sovereignty and non-
interference in their internal affairs, would grant pow-
ers to the supranational institutions that would limit 
the decision-making autonomy of member states. 
So far, only the formal side of both institutions and 
decision-making rules can be evaluated as too little 
time has passed to allow for an evaluation of specific 
cases, where, for example, in the event of a dispute, 
supranational powers would be put to practice or in 
the event of failure to implement decisions, sanctions 
would be imposed against any of the countries. 
II. Eurasian CU: economic and/or geopolitical 
project?
Assessing the motives behind the establishment 
of the Eurasian CU and the planned economic union, 
many analysts emphasise political and geopolitical 
considerations. Some highlight the instrumental im-
portance of this structure to increase Russia’s (and 
3 Steven Blockmans, Hrant Kostanyan, and Ievgen Vorobiov, 
“Towards a Eurasian Economic Union: The challenge of 
integration and unity”, CEPS Special Report, No. 75, 2012, 
available at: <http://www.ceps.be/book/towards-eurasian-
economic-union-challenge-integration-and-unity>.
4 Dragneva and Wolczuk, 8.
its partners’) importance in international politics and 
quote Putin’s aspiration to create “a powerful supra-
national structure” which would speak with the U.S.. 
China or such regional structures as the EU on an 
equal basis.5 Other studies note that the economic 
impact of the launch of this regional union has not 
been assessed properly by its initiators. Therefore, the 
conclusion is made that this process is dominated 
by political motives, although it is also emphasised 
that this process is much more complicated than 
it appears to many Western analysts and that the 
economy plays an important role in it.6 
As shown by many other examples of region-
al integration, including the EU, politically or 
geopolitically motivated initiatives can have a 
strong economic impact and broader political 
goals may be sought by economic means. We 
should remember that the Baltic countries formally 
applied for EU membership without conducting any 
further detailed evaluation of the economic impact 
of membership. This was undertaken only when EU 
membership negotiations were underway. In addi-
tion, as shown by the crisis of public finances and 
competitiveness  of some Eurozone countries, often 
even after extensive expert debate, regional integra-
tion projects may be implemented differently than 
proposed by analysts or declared by political leaders 
while inadequate implementation may be the con-
sequence of lobbying-interest groups, prevalence 
of short-term political interests (re-election of heads 
of states) and unforeseeable changes in the external 
environment. 
Geopolitical aspects of the Eurasian CU 
So what could be the geopolitical motives behind 
the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union? 
5 See Uwe Halbach, “Vladimir Putin’s Eurasian Union. A new 
integration project for the CIS?”, Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, SWP Comments, 2012; Hannes Adomeit, “Putin’s 
‘Eurasian Union’: Russia’s integration project and policies 
on Post-Soviet space”, Neighbourhood Policy Paper, No. 4, 
2012; Iwona Wisniewska, “The Customs Union of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia: a way to strengthen Moscow’s 
position in the region”, ISPI Analysis, No. 146, 2012.
6 Shumylo-Tapiola, Olga, “The Eurasian Customs Union: Friend 
or Foe of the EU?”, The Carnegie Papers, 2012, 6. 
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It should be noted that so far the advance of Russia’s 
influence in the post-Soviet space was based on 
effective instruments of “soft” (preferential gas 
prices, strengthening the position of the Russian 
language, etc.) and “hard” (deployment of military 
bases in the separatist conflict zones, the function of 
the geopolitical arbiter, etc.) power, yet weak binding 
international agreements did not provide leverage 
for Russia over the relations of post-Soviet states with 
alternative integration spaces. 
These weaknesses in the network of dependence 
relationships of post-Soviet states created by Russia 
were put under the spotlight by the EU’s “integration 
without membership” concept in the EU’s external 
relations, which through the Eastern Partnership 
started offering the following relationship formula 
to post-Soviet states: in exchange for adoption of 
European rules, partner countries get access to 
the EU internal market. Therefore, this formula 
offered rewards in exchange for participation 
in the EU’s inclusive space and adoption of 
European rules. 
It is within this geopolitical context that the Russian 
initiative emerged to establish an integration model 
of a new quality which would offer an alternative to 
the set of regulations exported by the EU. Thus, the 
underlying geopolitical objective of the Eurasian 
Economic Union is to create an alternative power 
centre for integration to the EU’s normative 
power, which would offer post-Soviet states more 
favourable conditions of access and participation. 
In the absence of an alternative power centre, the 
stimulus offered by the EU for integration into the EU 
internal market (participation of partner countries 
in the Eastern Partnership initiative, an enhanced 
free trade regime and facilitated movement of 
people) restricts Russia’s opportunities to retain 
political control over the CIS space. For instance, 
if an enhanced free trade regime takes effect 
between the EU and Ukraine, Ukraine would be 
harmonising it’s economic and trade standards 
(customs duties, technical specifications, standards, 
public procurement, etc.) with the EU, rather than 
with Russia. Meanwhile, setting up the CU of Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan (and the prospect of the 
Eurasian Economic Union) led the states located 
between the EU and Russia to being in an area where 
different institutional frameworks overlapped and 
at the same time offered them an alternative to the 
incentives proposed by the EU. 
 
From now on, the decision of the states located 
between the two integration spaces will depend on 
the cost-benefit balance between these competing 
political and economic integration spaces. In this 
case, Russia’s strength lies in two factors: a) in 
addition to similarity of regulatory norms based on 
former Soviet standards there are informal rules and 
practices (business-politics nexus characteristic to 
the post-Soviet space, corporate culture, oligarchic 
trends) which act as a kind of “adhesive” material for 
the post-Soviet space and b) Russia’s capabilities to 
combine economic integration with integration in 
the energy sector, more specifically, the possibility 
for Russia to supply energy to partner countries at 
Russian domestic market prices and Russia’s credit 
resources available for neighbouring countries. 
Based on these factors, functioning of the Eurasian 
Economic Union may reduce the advantages of 
the EU as a centre of attraction and undermine 
the functioning of such initiatives as the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership. 
In exchange for preferential prices for energy 
resources, provision of credits and access to its 
domestic market, Russia may take over strategic 
areas of economy of other members of the Eurasian 
Union and therefore strengthen its influence in these 
states. By integrating energy sectors, Russia may, 
in exchange for gas supply at domestic market 
prices, use mechanisms of the Eurasian Economic 
Union as a means to take over the partner 
countries’ energy infrastructure, establish joint 
ventures; develop energy corridors favourable to 
Russia, etc. The same processes may take place in 
the transport sector, where joint businesses could be 
established by Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan (such 
as a common railway company) to control the main 
Eurasian transport flows. 
Russia’s political leaders emphasise that the Eura-
sian Economic Union is an opportunity for post-Sovi-
et countries to strengthen their bargaining power in 
developing a common economic space with the EU. 
It is argued that by strengthening the integration of 
post-Soviet space, countries of the region will have 
more leverage to create a free trade area “from Lisbon 
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to Vladivostok” together with the EU according to 
the rules of the game beneficial to these countries. 
Despite the EU’s and Russia’s operations within the 
common WTO framework, differences between the 
rules and standards of the EU and the emerging Eura-
sian Economic Union shows that European integra-
tion and its new project in the post-Soviet space are 
two parallel processes, but they are not, at least so 
far, characterised by regulatory convergence. Thus, 
it would be appropriate to speak about competition 
of two alternative spaces of integration and power 
centres, but not their harmonisation.
The Eurasian Union may encounter obstacles 
that were not typical to, for example, EU integra-
tion. One of them is the normative approach of Eura-
sian countries (and Russia itself ) to cooperation in 
international organisations, particularly those of a 
supranational character. Within the EU, particularly 
close relations of interdependence exist, that give 
rise to the principle of voluntary delegation of sover-
eignty. Meanwhile Eurasia is a geopolitical space with 
a dominant “realpolitik” approach to international 
relations where the states follow the “golden” rule of 
non-interference in internal affairs. Such strategic 
approach restricts the process of voluntary del-
egation of sovereignty, devolution of powers to 
supranational institutions and turns the entire 
integration process into a geopolitical/economic 
exchange policy. 
Because of the decision-making procedure agreed 
within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Un-
ion such a scenario should not be excluded. Decisions 
of the CU Commission operating from 1 January 2010 
were supposed to be taken by qualified majority vot-
ing (Russia had 57% and Kazakhstan and Belarus – 
21.5% of the votes each) which meant that support 
of at least one member state was sufficient for Russia 
to take a decision. Such a system makes it possible 
to “buy” and “sell” one’s support for one or other 
initiative in favour of deepening of integration. 
Certain coincidences allow us to speak about such 
a possibility. Shortly after the presidents of Belarus, 
Russia and Kazakhstan signed the documents for 
the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union 
on 18 November 2011, information appeared about 
Russia-Belarus agreements concerning granting of 
more than USD 1 billion in credit and halving of the 
gas price (from USD 300 to USD 150/1,000 m³). These 
signs may indicate a trend whereby Russia’s grants to 
the Belarusian economy may be linked to the ongo-
ing support from Minsk to deepen integration of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. It should be noted that 
with the strengthening of the unanimity principle 
in the institutional architecture of the Eurasian 
Economic Union, conditions for “trading” political 
support for integration have not been abolished 
– formally reduced domination of one state will 
have to be replaced by “behind the doors” agree-
ments or consensus on nondecisionscharacteris-
tic to the CIS.  Application of the rule of qualified 
majority voting at least made influences more trans-
parent, while the transition to intergovernmentalism 
suggests a return to the “passive consensus” typical 
to the CIS and integration through bilateral pressure. 
Such a scheme can lead to higher integration costs 
to Russia, because unlike in the case of a qualified 
majority, Russia will need to “acquire” not one, but 
two voices with every round of decision making. 
Economic aspects of the Eurasian CU 
Recognising the importance of geo-political mo-
tives, it is also important to discuss economic ele-
ments of the Eurasian CU (and the economic union)7 
in greater detail – the main measures for integration, 
their (already visible or expected) effects, and cost-
benefit sharing between different actors. First, eco-
nomic aspects of such regional integration structures 
related to aligning of foreign trade policy measures 
and analysed in economic literature will be discussed. 
It is assumed that the Eurasian CU can be analysed 
using the same analytical tools as any other CU and 
therefore the benefits of trade liberalisation or the 
costs of the increased trade protection measures can 
be assessed and countries and societal groups which 
7 A customs union is a common commercial zone with the 
free movement of all goods regardless of whether they are 
produced in the CU or imported from other countries. An 
economic and monetary union is a further phase of the 
economic integration. The economic union involves 
1. A customs union (common external tariffs to third countries 
and the common commercial policy)
2. A single market (common product regulations and free 
movement of goods, capital, labour and services)
3. Coordination of the economic policy between member 
states.
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benefit or experience costs can be identified.8 The 
second important element is to identify factors on 
which a long-term (dynamic effect) rather than one-
off (static) integration effect is based. A third related 
issue is to discuss not only the elements of economic 
integration, but also political economy factors pro-
vided in the literature explaningthe establishment 
of such regional trade arrangements , and to assess 
their importance in the case of the Eurasian CU (and 
the economic union). 
Short-term CU effects: changes in customs duties
Assessment of the direct effect of the CU usually 
involves the analysis of the expected benefits related 
to the elimination of cost and non-tariff barriers to 
trade among members of the union (the so-called 
trade creation effect) and harm due to increased du-
ties on imports of goods from third countries (trade 
diversion).9 
The Eurasian CU, as authors who assess its ef-
fects note, compared to the previously signed CIS 
free trade agreements, is an important step towards 
deeper integration between Russia, Kazakhstan and 
Belarus. The CU embraces the steps that have already 
been initiated and related not only with the elimina-
tion of customs duties on trade between member 
states, but also with the elimination of non-tariff bar-
riers to trade between member states (simplification 
and elimination of customs clearance procedures at 
internal borders, harmonisation of quality standards) 
and unification of the external trade policy (especially 
8 Many studies referred to in this work analyse the Eurasian 
CU on this assumption, for example, one of the most recent 
assessments of the Eurasian CU is provided in: European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development: Transition Report 2012 
“Integration Across Borders”, London: EBRD, 62–78.
9 It is usually assumed that reduction of the level of trade 
protection provides a one-off benefit to consumers (which 
usually outweighs the adjustment pressures  due to increased 
competition, forcing restructuring and leading to dynamic 
benefts of more efficient production by previously protected 
domestic producers) while the increase of duties raises prices, 
reduces competitive pressure and may eventually lead to 
replacement of cheaper products from third countries with 
more costly local production. Non-tariff protection measures, 
such as product quality or safety standards, may also have a 
similar effect although it is more difficult to assess it.
import duties) mostly on the basis of the rules ap-
plied in Russia. So far, the CU has not been fully 
implemented, but plans are in progress on how 
to move forward and deepen integration, remove 
barriers to provision of services and capital and 
labour movement, and harmonise such policy ar-
eas as competition (the Eurasian Economic Union 
to be created by 2015). Since many of these inten-
tions are only on paper or still pending, only deci-
sions that have already been adopted and conditions 
for the implementation of the intentions or the risks 
involved in their implementation can be assessed 
at this point. 
Thus, in assessing the CU effect on the countries 
that have established it, it can be said that the most 
visible negative effect has been on Kazakhstan. This 
country had to increase nearly half of its tariffs on the 
import of goods from third countries (excluding CIS). 
The common external tariff was essentially aligned to 
Russian customs duties and coincided with approxi-
mately 80% of tariffs applied in Russia. Kazakhstan 
had therefore to raise the overall level of duty from 
6.2% to 10.6% of the weighted average rate. 10 The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment Bank (EBRD) estimates that because of the 
increase of duty on goods imported to Kazakh-
stan, there is a noticeable increase in trade diver-
sion by replacing cheaper products from China 
with goods from Russia.11 The study states that a 
0.5 percentage point increase of import duty most 
likely led to a 2-3% reduction on imports to Kazakh-
stan from the EU or 1-2% from all third countries.12 
It is therefore observed that implementation of 
the CU has complicated Kazakhstan’s prospects 
of accession to the WTO. In order to reduce the 
negative impact of increased duties, Kazakhstan (and 
in some cases Belarus too) negotiated exemptions 
for the common external tariff of the CU for around 
400 products until 2015. Other authors make similar 
10 Iwona Wisniewska, “The Customs Union of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia: a way to strengthen Moscow’s 
position in the region”, ISPI Analysis, No. 146, 2012, 1.
11 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development: 
Transition Report 2012 “Integration Across Borders”, London: 
EBRD, 2012, 69.
12 Ibid., 70.
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conclusions and suggest that trade diversions due to 
the implementation of Eurasian CU measures should 
have exceeded trade creation effects for Kazakhstan, 
while acknowledging that long term economic ben-
efits could be gained from the liberalisation of ser-
vices and access to the Russian market.13 
In the case of Russia and Belarus, a slight reduc-
tion of duties on products from third countries has 
been noted, even though, in Belarus, some import 
duties were increased (for example, for second-hand 
cars, therefore imports to Belarus from third (non-CIS) 
countries fell by about USD 1.1 billion).14 Assessing 
the impact of trade liberalisation within the Eura-
sian CU, a considerable (2/3) growth in trilateral 
trade in 2010-2011 was observed, although as 
the EBRD notes, this is partly due to the general 
global economic recovery after the financial crisis. 
The CU and the reduction of import duties on trade 
with third countries, according to the EBRD estimates, 
have been most beneficial for Russia. Eventually, 
Belarus should implement Russia’s WTO accession 
commitments, which would mean a reduction of im-
port duties. It would be beneficial to consumers, but 
would also create competitive pressure and serious 
economic difficulties in the country’s vital industries 
– production of trucks, tractors and other agricultural 
machinery, refrigerators, electronic goods, building 
materials, fertilisers and other products (about 50 
types of products).15 Most-favoured-nation tariffs, 
which came into effect in Russia on its accession to 
the WTO, will not be applied with respect to exports 
from Belarus. In addition, opening of the Russian 
market to manufacturers from third countries will 
create additional pressure on Belarusian enter-
prises to compete in the CU. This may lead to a 
wave of corporate bankruptcies or restructuring 
in Belarus and to the political pressure concerning 
13 Asel Isakova and Alexander Plekhanov, “Customs Union 
and Kazakhstan’s Imports”, CASE Studies, No. 442, 2012.
14 Irina Tochitskaya, “The Customs Union between Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia: an overview of economic implications 
for Belarus”, CASE Studies, No. 405, 2010.
15 Kamil Klysinski, “Consequences for the Belarusian economy 
of Russia’s entry into the WTO”, East Week, 29 (305), 2012, 
available at: <http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/
eastweek/2012-09-12/consequences-belarusian-economy-
russia-s-entry-wto>. 
the reverting to trading restrictions or requests of 
financial compensation from Russia. Such a situa-
tion would facilitate further penetration of Russian 
state companies into the Belarusian economy. 
Assessing the overall impact of CU, according to 
the EBRD analysts, changes in tariffs related to the 
implementation of the CU have so far had little im-
pact on the overall trade flows. On the one hand, 
this can be explained by the period assessed, which 
is short. Corporate response to changing economic 
conditions takes time, moreover, many businesses 
respond in advance on the basis of the expectations 
formed by the proposed policies. In addition, the 
exploitation of economies of scale in a larger com-
mon trade space is also a long-term process and its 
effects may depend on the structure of the economy 
and other factors. The fact that natural resources 
(including energy) account for the major portion 
of Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s economies and trade 
structures, while in Belarus, these resources are 
important as a (re)exported product, has reduced 
the economic development potential offered by 
integration. Trading of energy resources (such as 
oil) is still subject to exceptions from the CU regime 
(for example, an export tax). 
It should be noted that other analysts, model-
ling changes in duties on the basis of the general 
equilibrium model, critically assess the impact of the 
Eurasian CU, although they rely on other data about 
tariff changes in Kazakhstan (smaller number of tariff 
increases and greater reductions than those in previ-
ously cited studies). Their conclusion is that the CU 
measures reduce the overall economic develop-
ment of its members, because the trade diversion 
effect should be greater than that of trade crea-
tion. 16 Estimates also show that due to external tariff 
harmonisation, Kazakhstan would incur economic 
losses, but could also have an economic benefit from 
the removal of non-tariff barriers, although there has 
16 Lucio Vinhas De Souza, “An initial estimation of the economic 
effects of the creation of the EuraAsEC Customs Union on its 
members”, Economic Premise, No. 47, 2011.
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been very little progress in this area.17 Despite that, 
Russian representatives have announced that the 
CU will contribute to the faster economic growth 
of all three countries, which by 2015 will contribute 
to an increase of gross domestic product (GDP) by 
around 14-15%.18 Such assessments are inconsistent 
with the findings of independent analysts, therefore 
it is likely that they are based not only on overly op-
timistic assumptions, but also that estimates include 
the benefits of elimination of various non-tariff bar-
riers though it is still too early to speak about their 
practical implementation.  
The CU effect: elimination of non-tariff barriers
So far, the relatively limited effect of the CU on 
the countries involved in it may show a relatively 
low importance of duties (tariff barriers) to trade 
as compared to non-tariff barriers. Elimination of 
non-tariff barriers to trade is an important factor 
which is difficult to assess primarily because it re-
lates to more general economic policy measures 
such as business environment, institutional qual-
ity, corruption level, etc. It is true that, as the EBRD 
study states, one extra day in transit (in the queue 
at customs) may increase the price of a product by 
around 0.6–2.3%.19 It is considered that elimination 
of barriers did have a positive effect on trade flows 
and economic development of CU member states. 
However, at this stage it is best to speak about the 
untapped potential of eliminating non-tariff bar-
riers in the CU, which can be illustrated by such 
comparison: should problems of external customs 
procedures be addressed, exports could increase 
by about 44%.20 In other words, the effects of trade 
17 World Bank, “Assessment of Costs and Benefits of the 
Customs Union for Kazakhstan”, Report, No. 65977-KZ, 2012. 
It should be noted that if all three countries were members of 
the WTO, other WTO members could ask for compensations 
for increase of duties for external imports, because this 
is inconsistent with the WTO regional trade agreement 
conditions.
18 RIA Novosti, “Customs Union to increase Russia, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan’s GDP by 15 percent – Duma 
speaker”, Moscow, 2010, available at: <http://en.rian.ru/
exsoviet/20100104/157463375.html>. 
19 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 71.
20 Ibid. 71.
liberalisation, particularly in the long-term, would 
be significant, if proper institutional conditions for 
this were created.  
In this respect, it is useful to recall other aspects of 
the formation of regional integration arrangements. 
In addition to traditional explanations of the devel-
opment of regional economic unions which analyse 
the ratio between trade creation and trade diversion, 
changes in terms of trade with third countries, and 
opportunities for economies of scale, investment 
attraction, and growth in the effectiveness of com-
petition, analysts often identify political economy 
or “non-traditional” effects which may also be im-
portant for the development of regional integra-
tion structures.21 Of such motives, the impact of 
regional agreements on domestic reforms and 
the consistency of economic policy in general, 
“locking-in” trade liberalisation so that interest 
groups seeking protection would find it more dif-
ficult to revert to a higher level of protection in 
foreign trade, and the ensurance against “trade 
wars” with the main partners which is especially 
important to smaller countries may be mentioned. 
Finally, strengthening of the bargaining power of 
all countries involved in regional integration in 
dealings with third countries may be important 
driver for regional integration.  
Political economy factors in developing the CU 
In assessing each of these motives briefly, it should 
be noted that the effect of the Eurasian CU on reforms 
in the CU member states, at least in the coming years, 
will not be significant because, unlike the Central and 
Eastern European countries, which simultaneously 
implemented economic reforms and liberalised trade 
both with the EU and with each other, countries of 
the Eurasian Union do not implement any significant 
structural reforms. Furthermore, given the political 
regimes in these countries and the powers their 
leaders hold, it is questionable whether they 
are in need of additional safeguards capable 
of reducing the influence of interest groups 
21 See Raquel Fernandes and Jonathan Portes, “Returns to 
Regionalism: An Analysis of Non-traditional Gains from 
Regional Trade Agreements”, The World Bank Economic Review, 
Vol 12, No 2, 1998, 197–220.
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seeking trade protection and thus achieving 
the “tied hands” effect. On the other hand, even 
after Russia’s WTO accession, both the country’s 
policy and criticism by the EU and U.S. concerning 
trade protection measures incompatible with WTO 
rules show the influence retained by interest groups 
and their ties with the country’s political leaders.22 
In addition, in recent years, several trade disputes 
occurred among the members of the Eurasian CU, 
which indicates limited effect of the agreement on 
trade liberalisation and on the establishment of a 
stable business environment.23 Inconsistency in 
fulfilling trade liberalisation obligations also weakens 
the positive CU “signalling” function, which should 
send a message to foreign investors that this regional 
agreement will contribute to economic development 
and will later lead to realisation of further integration 
plans.  
A broader factor related with the benefit of 
suchregional agreements is the quality of institutions 
and an opportunity to strengthen the quality 
by introducingliberal trade rules and an open 
competitive environment. Institutional quality in 
the economic literature has long been referred to 
as one of the key factors in economic development 
and it can be evaluated using such criteria as 
competitiveness, economic freedom, quality of 
governance, perception of corruption, etc. which 
allow international comparisons and benchmarking 
of different countries. Looking at the three countries 
discussed in light of these indices, it can be noted that, 
according to the estimates of the World Economic 
Forum, in the 2012–2013 Global Competitiveness 
Index, Russia is ranked 67th (66th the previous year), 
Kazakhstan is ranked 51st (72nd the previous year), and 
Belarus is not ranked; in the 2012 Index of Economic 
Freedom of the Heritage Foundation, Russia is at 
22 As the EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht said in early 
December 2012 referring to the new rules introduced in Russia 
restricting the import of a variety of products (cars, pork, 
wood) from other WTO members, “after Russia’s accession to 
the WTO, they are doing everything contrary to what they 
should be or what they have committed themselves to”. See 
Joshua Chaffin, “Europe cools on Russia’s WTO accession”, 
Financial Times, 2012,
available at: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ff524424-3eff-
11e2-9214-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2EM4PGKDC>.
23 Shumylo-Tapiola, 11.
144th, Kazakhstan – 65th, and Belarus – 153rd place; 
according to the World Bank’s Doing Business 2013 
report, Russia ranks 112th , Kazakhstan – 49th, and 
Belarus – 58th; in the Transparency International 
2012 Corruption Perception Index, Russia and 
Kazakhstan share 133rd place, while Belarus is in the 
123rd place; and according to the 2012 Bertelsmann 
Transformation Index, Russia ranked 60th, Kazakhstan 
– 79th, and Belarus – 101st.24 
In the competitiveness ranking, Russia and 
particularly Kazakhstan are rated better than, for 
example, Greece, but in many other international 
comparisons, all three countries are ranked 
significantly worse than the EU or the countries 
of the Economic Co-operation and Development 
Organisation (OECD). When the integration of 
similarly poorly assessed countries takes place, it 
is difficult to expect that their mutual integration 
may give a boost to the growth of institutional 
quality of the Eurasian Union, because it is hard 
to find good practice models to be followed by 
other members of the union. It is important that 
these weaknesses in the institutional environment 
in the future will limit the benefit of the customs 
and economic union to its current and potential 
members, unless such essential conditions for 
economic activities, and transparent competitive 
environment are established and implemented in 
practice. 
Another possible scenario is higher quality activities 
of supranational institutions (EEC, court), which would 
serve as a model for national authorities of member 
states. This can be realised in different technical areas, 
for instance, by streamlining customs procedures 
with respect to third countries. As for more general 
competences of supranational institutions and the 
quality of their decisions, their superiority in an 
increasing number of economic policy areas could 
weaken the influence, particularly informal, of the 
heads of state, therefore such scenario, given the 
specific political system of all three CU members, 
seems unlikely at least for now. 
24 Available at: <http://www.weforum.org/>; <http://www.
heritage.org/>; <http://www.doingbusiness.org/>; <http://
www.transparency.org/>; <http://www.bti-project.org/
index/status-index/>.
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Finally, one of the most common reasons for 
the development of regional structures is the 
strengthening of bargaining power in dealings with 
third countries (and other regional structures). The 
Eurasian Union is undoubtedly associated with the 
larger bargaining power of Russia and other member 
states in their relations with the EU, China and other 
WTO members. As has already been mentioned, 
this is probably one of the main motives behind 
the creation of the union, particularly from the 
point of view of the Russian leadership and this 
motive may in the future manifest in attempts to 
persuade the EU to move from bilateral relations, 
particularly in trade with Russia and other 
Eurasian countries, to relations with the regional 
organisation. One of the actual signs that show 
Russia’s and Belarus’ desire to exploit the Eurasian 
economic space format in their relations with the 
EU, is the common statement of all three members 
of the union on 11 March 2012 concerning the 
unacceptable sanctions of the EU and U.S. imposed 
on Belarus. 
Moreover, further increase in bargaining power 
is one of the reasons to continue enlargement of 
the Eurasian Union to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
and possibly also Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova are also consid-
ered potential members of the Eurasian Union, al-
though the major issue for the development of this 
regional group is over Ukraine, the country of the 
Eastern Partnership most advanced in negotiations 
with the EU regarding the association agreement 
and trade liberalisation. According to some analysts, 
Ukraine has turned into a “normative battleground” 
between the EU and Russia.25 If Ukraine decided to 
join the Eurasian CU (and economic union), the 
importance of this organisation in international 
relations would significantly increase. 
25 Dragneva and Wolczuk.
III. (In)compatibility of the Eurasian CU with 
WTO rules
Relationship between regional economic inte-
gration and international trade liberalisation 
The issue of compatibility between the region-
al economic integration seen through preferential/
free trade agreements or a CU and the rules of inter-
national trade has existed since the establishment 
of the international system of regulations. In the 
post-war period, 1947–1948, during the negotiations 
on the International Trade Organisation Charter, the 
U.S. opposed the exemptions from universal rules 
of international trade that Great Britain and other 
European countries wanted to retain in their former 
colonies. At that time, Lebanon and Syria suggested 
possible exemptions applicable to a free trade area, 
where the countries of the area would eliminate 
trade barriers for each other, but would maintain 
an independent trade policy regime in respect to 
third countries outside the free trade area and this 
idea was strongly supported not only by other de-
veloping countries, but also by France which was 
considering a CU with Italy.26 
The ITO Charter never took effect, because the U.S. 
Congress refused to ratify it. However, since 1948, 
provisional application of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) started and included 
exemptions that the countries could apply estab-
lishing a CU or a free trade area.27 Perhaps the most 
important principle of contemporary international 
trade requires non-discrimination between different 
trading partners. One of the elements of this prin-
ciple is the so-called Most-Favoured-Nation Treat-
ment (MFN) regime entrenched in GATT provisions.28 
Naturally, when two or more countries create a free 
26 Regionalism and the World Trading System. 
27 Many authors agree and treat Article XXIV of GATT as a 
special exemption from the general principles of international 
trade as compared to the general exemptions provided for 
in Article XX of GATT or security excemptions provided for 
in Article XXI of GATT. For more details see Peter Van Den 
Bossche, “The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organisation: 
Text, Cases and Materials”, World Trade Law: Text, Material and 
Commentary.
28 GATT.
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trade agreement or a CU (which is even a deeper 
form of regional economic integration, because in 
addition to the elimination of trade barriers between 
CU countries they also adopt a common trade regime 
for third parties), the MFN principle is violated. As 
has already been mentioned, the international trade 
rules allow doing this, but at the same time, GATT 
provides a number of important requirements to be 
met by the countries which selected a certain form 
of regional economic integration.
In 1995, following the establishment of the WTO, 
trade rules and principles of traditional trade in goods 
were extended to trade in services and protection 
of intellectual property. The General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) also recognises the right 
of countries to deeper economic integration and 
in parallel to GATT establishes similar requirements 
for the said two forms of regional integration.29 An 
integral part of the agreement establishing the WTO 
is the Memorandum of Understanding on the Inter-
pretation of Article XXIV of GATT, which clarifies and 
supplements some of the provisions of this article 
that took effect in 1948.30
Detailed analysis of the requirements set out by 
the WTO for free trade areas or CU agreements shows 
that there are internal and external requirements.31 
First of all, under Paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of GATT, 
countries concluding economic integration agree-
ments must eliminate duties and other restric-
tive trade measures for substantially all trade.32 In 
addition, CU countries are required to apply the 
same duties and other trade rules vis-a-vis third 
countries. In addition to the said requirements for 
mutual trade under Paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of 
GATT, some authors argue, that the regional inte-
gration exemption can only be used by WTO mem-
29 GATS.
30 See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of 
the General. 
31 See “The World Trade Organization and Regional Trade 
Agreements: bridging the constitutional credibility gap”.
32 It should be noted that there is no consensus among 
the WTO members regarding a more explicit definition of 
“substantially all the trade” specified in Paragraph 8(a)(i) of 
Article XXIV of GATT. 
bers, while compliance of such agreement with 
WTO rules can be questioned when a preferential 
trade agreement is concluded between a WTO 
member and a non-WTO-member country.33 This 
is not really a strong argument in analysing conform-
ity of a specific regional integration agreement with 
WTO requirements, because so far, the discussions 
of the WTO Committee on Regional Trade Agree-
ments regarding preferential trade agreements 
between WTO members and non-WTO members 
predominantly focus on the quality of such agree-
ments rather than membership. Such agreements 
also exist between the EU and third countries. For 
instance, in 1997, the WTO Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements discussed free trade agreements 
between the then European Communities (EC) and 
Lithuania (as well as two other Baltic states) and the 
Japanese delegate noted that although the three 
Baltic states were not members of the WTO, it was 
expected that requirements of Article XXIV of GATT 
and Article V of GATS would be respected. At the 
same meeting, Australian and U.S. delegates also 
wondered how the EC free trade agreements con-
cluded with non-WTO members eliminated trade 
barriers for substantially all trade between the con-
tracting parties.34 
Other requirements of Paragraph 5(a) of Article 
XXIV of GATT establish that forming a CU, duties for 
third countries shall not on the whole be higher 
or more restrictive than prior to the formation of 
such union. The Memorandum of Understanding on 
the Interpretation of Article XXIV of GATT explains 
that evaluation of the requirements of Paragraph 
5(a) of Article XXIV shall be based on the changes 
in weighted average tariff rates and customs duties 
collected. 35 Paragraph 6 of Article XXIV states that if 
one of the members of the CU increases the rate 
33 Legal problems of making regional trade agreements with 
non-WTO-Member States.
34 3 October 1997, WT/REG1/M/1, WT/REG2/M/1, WT/
REG7/M/1 WT/REG8/M/1, WT/REG9/M/1 and WT/REG18/M/1.
35 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the 
General.
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of duty above the frozen level,36 compensatory 
adjustments must be arranged for the remaining 
members of the WTO according to the procedure 
provided for in Article XXVIII of GATT. Finally, one 
of the last provisions of Article XXIV of GATT is that 
the transitional period for the formation of a CU 
or concluding free trade area agreements cannot 
exceed 10 years. 
The WTO so far has received 511 notifications 
(assessing trade in goods and services separately) 
about regional preferential trade agreements, 319 
of these agreements are in force. Many countries 
around the world are parties to one or more agree-
ments and only Mongolia has not entered into any 
such agreement.37 
The place of the Eurasian Economic Union in the 
WTO architecture 
Russia’s free trade and CU agreements discussed 
in the report of the working group for Russia’s acces-
sion to the WTO note bilateral free trade agreements 
with CIS countries; the bilateral free trade agreement 
with Georgia; the agreement on CU between Russia 
and Belarus dated 6 January 1995, the agreement on 
CU and the Single Economic Space dated 26 Febru-
ary 1999 as well as the agreement on the establish-
ment of the Eurasian Economic Community with 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan dated 
10 October 2000, the agreement on establishing a 
union state with Belarus dated 8 December 1999, 
the agreement on establishing the Single Economic 
Space with Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan dated 
19 September 2003; and the agreement on a com-
mon customs territory and establishment of the CU 
of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia dated 6 October 
2007, according to which on 1 January 2010, the 
CU and its institutions were launched together 
with a common external tariff, and starting July 
36 According to the requirements of Article II of GATT, all WTO 
member states freeze their import duties at a certain level in 
line with the outcomes of the Uruguay Round and the WTO 
accession negotiations. Import duties are frozen for a specific 
product (tariff line) and provided in the so-called lists of 
obligations for opening the commodity market. 
37 Available at: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
region_e/region_e.htm>. 
2010, the CU Customs Code came into force and 
customs inspection inside the CU was abolished.38 
Many of these agreements have not been fully 
implemented and have been replaced with new 
agreements serving similar purpose, however it is 
evident that integration of Russia, Belarus and Ka-
zakhstan began back in 1995 while the establish-
ment of the Eurasian Economic Community, which 
seeks to achieve free movement of goods, services 
and capital on the basis of agreements, started in 
2000. To this end, in 2003–2006, a few more agree-
ments were concluded or decisions of the leaders of 
the Eurasian Economic Union were made. Finally, in 
2000, the Treaty on the establishment of the Eurasian 
Economic Community was amended by the 2007 
agreement on the establishment of the CU with three 
of the five original parties to the agreement. 
Since the start of the integration process, a 
trend has been observed that the declared date 
of implementation is in practice delayed. The delay 
may vary from a few months to several years. Thus, 
for example, the introduction of the common cus-
toms area took place between 1 January 2010 and 
1 July 2011 when the customs treatment of goods 
was finally moved to the external borders of the 
CU, but even after that date, Russia tried to retain 
mandatory customs clearance procedures for indi-
vidual groups of products exported even to other CU 
countries.39 Further integration and the founding of 
the Single Economic Space as well as taking effect 
of the relevant agreements was declared starting 
1 January 2012 and one tangible result of this was 
noticed a month later, i.e. in February 2012, the EEC 
came into operation which is a legal successor of 
the CU Commission rights. The aim of the Eurasian 
Economic Space is not only free movement of goods, 
but also of services, capital and labour, coordinated 
tax and fiscal policies, common economic regula-
tions, and common infrastructure. There seems to be 
political will in place and efforts have been made in 
certain cases to achieve these goals, but on the other 
hand, it is clear that the process will take more than 
38 WT/ACC/RUS/70.
39 See the ruling of 5 September 2012 of the Court of 
Eurasian Economic Community.
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a few years. Therefore, the declared goal that the 
Eurasian Economic Union with common external 
trade rules and common general macro-economic 
and fiscal policies will come into operation in 2015 
is primarily a political goal and aspiration rather 
than a realistic date, particularly considering the 
level of integration achieved so far. 
The analysis of the conformity of the current 
CU of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus with WTO 
requirements, particularly with the provisions of 
Article XXIV of GATT, shows that the final common 
external tariff will take effect after a five-year transition 
period. For example, for some goods the common 
external tariff will take effect beginning in 2014, for 
other goods – beginning in 2015. Still, after the 
CU had taken effect, the common external tariff 
covered 95% of all tariff lines. Import duties were 
eliminated in trade between the CU countries, 
but Russia eliminated export duties only on 
goods for Kazakhstan, but retained them for oil 
and petroleum products exported to Belarus. 
According to the 2009 statistics, this accounted for 
19% of total CU trade and as much as 27% of Russian-
Belarusian trade turnover. Different export duties 
are also applied in respect of third countries by 
all three CU states. According to the 2009 data, 
this should account for 35% of total CU external 
trade.40 It can be stated that today’s Eurasian CU 
does not fully comply with the requirements of 
Paragraph 8 of Article XXIV of GATT, but given the 
objectives of ongoing integration, it is likely that 
within the 10-year transitional period allowed by 
the WTO, compliance with WTO requirements can 
be achieved. 
Assessing the relationship and cooperation 
between the CU or emerging Eurasian Econom-
ic Union and the WTO, cooperation within the 
framework of the WTO will take place with each 
CU country separately. The finalisation of the ne-
gotiations regarding membership of Kazakhstan in 
the WTO can be expected in the next few years, but 
the situation with Belarus is much more complicated. 
40 WT/ACC/RUS/70. 
Potential membership of the CU or the Eurasian 
Economic Union as an economic structure in the 
WTO should be analysed on the basis of the require-
ments of Article XII of the Marrakesh Agreement 
which established the WTO.41 According to these 
requirements, an independent economic struc-
ture, particularly consisting of several countries, 
must have not only common rules for trade in 
services, including rules on the establishment 
and investment regime, but also a common legal 
framework for intellectual property protection 
and common public procurement regulation. The 
Eurasian CU has not reached such integration; only 
the EU meets such requirements. 
It should be remembered that the EC was among 
the founding members of the WTO and this exclusive 
status is marked in Article XI of the Marrakesh Agree-
ment. At the same time, all EU Member States are 
members of the WTO individually and the EU mem-
bership did not guarantee automatic membership in 
the WTO. On the contrary, countries accessing the EU 
had to become members of the WTO. It should also 
be noted that representation of common interests of 
the EU in daily activities of the WTO within the frame-
work of multilateral negotiations and WTO dispute 
resolution is regulated under EU law, primarily Article 
207 of the TFEU,42 rather than under the WTO rules. 
But even this allows individual EU Member States to 
speak individually at the WTO Budget, Finance and 
Administration Committee.43 
Such a model for operation within the WTO 
should be applied to the emerging Eurasian 
Economic Union, after all its member states 
become members of the WTO. Moreover, there 
is an established tradition among members of 
the WTO to form groups or coalitions for stronger 
representation of their interests in negotiations. 
Although some of these groups seem to be 
established on a regional basis, primarily they 
41 Marrakesh Agreement. 
42 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, available 
at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=
OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:lt:PDF 
43http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/
european_communities_e.htm>.
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represent a particular economic interest in some 
area of bargaining.44
In assessing participation of Kazakhstan in the CU 
and the emerging Eurasian Economic Union it is obvi-
ous that this process has complicated Kazakhstan’s 
negotiations for WTO membership. 
Kazakhstan’s WTO accession negotiations ran 
into complications on the issue of the opening 
of the market for goods on the basis of bilateral 
negotiations with individual WTO members 
(negotiations have been completed with many 
members). However, when the common CU 
external tariffs came into effect, Kazakhstan’s 
import duties changed (mostly increased). Given 
that Kazakhstan fulfilled its commitment on 
import duties under the bilateral agreement with 
the WTO before the establishment of the CU,45 it 
is clear that a complex period of new negotiations 
is expected during which Kazakhstan’s bilateral 
commitments will have to be adjusted against the 
valid CU common external tariff. 
Modelling EU policy concerning the recognition/
non-recognition of the Eurasian Economic Union or 
planning scenarios for cooperation with the Eurasian 
Economic Union, it is necessary to take into account 
the WTO rules governing activities of such economic 
structures. According to these rules, as long as there 
are members of the Eurasian Economic Union, 
which have not joined the WTO, and cooperation 
is maintained, according to the WTO framework, 
with each of these members individually, the 
EU should develop its relations not with the 
Eurasian Economic Union as an independent 
unit, but with individual member states. There 
is an additional argument – current integration level 
achieved by the Eurasian Economic Union does not 
allow the structure, as an independent economic 
unit, to establish membership in the WTO. 
44 Available at: <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/
dda_e/negotiating_groups_e.htm>. 
45 Available at: <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
acc_e/a1_kazakhstan_e.htm>. 
IV. Reasons for participation in the Eurasian 
Economic Union
Russia’s motives
Assessing the relationships between members of 
the Eurasian Union and reasons for participation in 
the union, it should be noted that Russia, for various 
reasons performs the role of the main initiator and 
integration engine. Russia’s economy accounts for 
the largest portion of the region. For Kazakhstan and 
especially Belarus, Russia is important as an export 
market and source of import. Meanwhile, for Rus-
sia, the market of these two countries is relatively 
insignificant. This gives Russia greater bargaining 
power in solving issues of CU economic regulation 
and the Single Economic Space. It is likely that 
the dominant decision-making behaviour dur-
ing joint agreements will become the transfer of 
rules and principles applicable in Russia to the 
other two countries of the union. Given that Rus-
sia has already become a member of the WTO, this 
process may have a positive impact on the economy 
of Kazakhstan and Belarus, but the strengthening of 
regulatory and institutional quality will take place 
only if Russia fully respects WTO principles and agree-
ments in force (which, as we have mentioned above, 
raises serious doubts). 
It is also likely that the supranational institutions 
of the Eurasian Union (EEC, the Court of the Eurasian 
Economic Union) will primarily focus on the position 
of Russian institutions and current policy, because 
this will decrease the likelihood of non-compliance 
with their decisions. Although formally all states in-
volved are equal and are represented in the Supreme 
Eurasian Economic Council, also the Eurasian Com-
mission should act independently from CU states, 
certain appointments, such as the Chairman of the 
EEC Council, show that Russia’s leaders attribute great 
importance to these institutions and probably will 
seek that their activities would be consistent with 
Russia’s interests. 
After assessment of literature analysing regional 
trade arrangements, particularly the works that em-
phasise the importance exerted by one dominant 
regional union member on joint agreements and 
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integration process,46 it can be stated that even if the 
importance of geopolitical motives and ambitions 
is disregarded, the Eurasian Union is primarily a 
process supported by the Russian leadership and 
should be regarded as a tool for realising its poli-
cies and interests. Since the creation of the Eurasian 
Union will inevitably necessitate consensus among 
all countries on issues of economic regulation and 
possibly taxation, any such arrangements are likely 
to be formed on the basis of Russia’s proposed solu-
tions. Russia’s importance stems not only from the 
asymmetry of economic interdependence, but also 
from its ability to finance joint initiatives or to allocate 
money for countries participating in the union, as 
shown by the financial assistance to Belarus provided 
through Eurasian institutions. The participation of 
Belarus in the union is important to Russia not only 
for economic reasons, including transit to Kalinin-
grad and the EU market, but also for geopolitical 
and security reasons. 
Finally, the fact that by choosing establishment 
of the CU, Russia complicated its bilateral trade and 
economic relations with the EU and other countries, 
should not be overlooked. Due to launch of the CU, 
Russia’s WTO membership was postponed for a few 
years while the EU-Russia post-PCA negotiation 
stagnated.  
Russia has always been an important strategic 
partner for Europe, but by choosing regional inte-
gration as its priority and at the same time increasing 
confrontation in trade with the EU, Russia may be 
seeking to avoid dialogue with the EU, which after 
the Lisbon Treaty started speaking with one voice, 
because this would allow returning to bilateral rela-
tions with separate “friendlier” EU Member States. 
This assumption can be made on the basis of Russia’s 
statements that the negotiations with the EU should 
be conducted not on the bilateral EU-Russia grounds, 
but on the inter-regional EU-Eurasian Economic Un-
ion grounds (in view of the political and economic 
systems of the states which constitute the Eurasian 
Economic Union, there is no ground to assume that 
46 See Richard E. Baldwin, “The Causes of Regionalism”, The 
World Economy, Vol. 20, No. 7, 1997, 865–888; Mattli Walter, 
The Logic of Regional Integration, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999.
the inter-regional negotiations would take place any 
easier than bilateral). CU initiators and authors may 
have estimated that Russian economy is not yet ready 
to compete on equal terms with the countries of the 
EU, especially knowing the opinion of the majority of 
EU countries that Russia’s WTO membership should 
only be the first step towards further liberalisation of 
trade and investment. In this case, the CU idea might 
be just a smokescreen for Russia realising that it will 
not be able to respond equally to a trade liberalisa-
tion offer from the EU. 
Belarus’ motives
Participation of Belarus in this regional integration 
process seems to be motivated, on the one hand, 
by relatively low adjustment costs, because most 
standards were already in place as a result of previous 
intensive Russian-Belarusian economic cooperation. 
Furthermore, Russia is not only the supplier of 
energy resources (oil and natural gas) at lower 
prices to Belarus and to its businesses, but also 
the main market for core Belarusian export goods 
(around 90% of food products and around 70% 
of equipment produced in Belarus are sold in 
Russia).47 
On the other hand, the A. Lukashenka has a strong 
incentive to use this process as a counterweight to 
the countries and organisations in the West which 
have applied sanctions to the regime. Financial 
assistance to Belarus, probably not coincidentally, 
provided not as abilateral Russian support but 
as support through institutions of the Eurasian 
Economic Community (which consists not only 
of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, but also of 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) is one of the 
main reasons for the Belarusian elite. It is probably 
no coincidence either that in the run-up to the 
2010 presidential elections in Belarus, its leader, 
after initial reluctance, finally agreed to sign the 
tripartite CU Code. It was in the same year that 
Russia decided to reduce the price of oil sold to 
Belarus to the level of the Russian domestic market 
price and later Putin announced that he would 
47 Iwona Wisniewska, “The Customs Union of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia: a way to strengthen Moscow’s 
position in the region”, ISPI, No. 146, 2012, 5.
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apply the same pricing for natural gas, calling it 
an “integration discount”.48 
It is obvious, however, that the Belarusian presi-
dent, although having agreed to sell shares of some 
infrastructure companies of Belarus to Russian com-
panies, is not enthusiastic about moving towards 
deepening regional integration. Further integration 
with other members of the Eurasian Union would 
increasingly restrict his capacities  to retain his 
power and the current Belarusian regime, espe-
cially when initiatives such as a monetary union 
are implemented, which would directly limit his 
possibilities to manipulate the monetary policy 
to create an illusion of welfare growth for the 
population. However, to maintain his power, when 
faced with the choice between further integration 
within the Eurasian Union as well as Russia’s advance 
in the Belarusian economy and the renewal of rela-
tions with the EU, which is associated with political 
reforms, he may choose the first option. However, 
in this case, the claim that Belarus was a voluntary 
participant in the formation of the Eurasian Union 
and that the Eurasian economic integration is based 
on a bottom-up principle is hard to maintain.49 
In summary, it can be said that due to interests of 
the political regime and the unwillingness to lose com-
plete economic sovereignty, Belarus is not interested 
in the transformation of the Eurasian CU into a fully-
fledged economic and monetary union. However, 
the demand for economic concessions and financial 
resources from Russia might make the current political 
regime extend its support for further deepening the 
integration of the Eurasian economic space.  
As far as the democratic choice is concerned, it 
should be noted that in the case of Belarus, Kazakh-
48 Hannes Adomeit, “Putin’s ‘Eurasian Union’: Russia’s 
integration project and policies on Post-Soviet space”, 
Neighbourhood Policy Paper, No. 4, 2012, 4.
49 Belarus’ energy dependence on Russia (90%–nearly 100%) 
in the natural gas and oil sectors, in the past two decades, 
drove Belarus to various economic and political integration 
projects with Russia – from the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation, to the creation of the Union State, however the 
integration has been essentially on the exchange basis (lower 
energy price/loan in exchange for integration/ownership of 
strategic objects). 
stan, and Russia it is difficult to talk about independ-
ent decisions in the same sense as the EU member 
states. None of the countries of Eurasian union can 
be attributed to a free society,50 which means there 
is absence of the rule of law and fair trials. Naturally, 
all these attributes should be transferred to the re-
gional structure. In addition to the likely democracy 
deficit and  power asymmetries within the Eurasian 
union as an organisation (as mentioned above), it is 
a union of nondemocratic regimes also when judged 
by OSCE election monitoring reports only51. 
Kazakhstan’s motives
In the case of Kazakhstan, the economic mo-
tivation to participate in the tripartite CU is rel-
atively weakest among the three; specifically, 
at least so far, the negative economic effects 
of membership appear to be greater than the 
positive ones. In the longer term, the creation of a 
common space can attract more foreign direct in-
vestment at the expense of the other two countries, 
particularly since Kazakhstan gets better rankings in 
the areas important to investors. Moreover, agree-
ment provides better conditions for export to the 
Russian market important to Kazakhstan. However, 
the main explanation for the participation of Kazakh-
stan should be associated with political motives – a 
strategic partnership with Russia, balancing be-
tween Russia and China and possibly the personal 
desire of the country’s leader to make a mark in 
the history of the country (back in 1994, he pro-
posed creating the Eurasian Union, although 
composed of more CIS countries). 
In summary, it can be said that although creation 
of the Eurasian CU can today be seen as the first sig-
nificant step towards practical regional integration in 
the CIS territory, its implementation has so far been 
accompanied by the institutional inconsistency and 
uncertainty of the final goal, while the motivation 
of the countries involved is quite different. There 
are even more uncertainties about the further in-
50 Freedom in the World 2012, <http://www.freedomhouse.
org/report-types/freedom-world>. 
51 OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 
<http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections>.
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tegration plans of the Eurasian Economic Union. As 
has already been mentioned, the formation of the 
Eurasian Economic Union, which started at the begin-
ning of 2012 on the basis of the CU, should include 
implementation of all “four freedoms”, i.e. establish-
ment of a single market. As Putin mentioned in his 
statements, in the long run, other economic policies 
should be aligned and a “complete economic union” 
should be created, which would be equivalent to the 
Economic and Monetary Union, and finally would be 
able to become a political union.52 
Why is it difficult to follow in the footsteps of 
the EU? 
The vision of the Eurasian Economic Union quite 
clearly echoes stages of the EU’s development. In the 
course of developing the CU, the creation of a single 
market started. In some areas, such as the labour 
movement, the three countries have already liberal-
ised and agreed the rules and workers from partner 
countries are treated like nationals. In other areas, 
however, there are a number of obstacles, including 
non-tariff barriers to movement of goods. Barriers to 
free movement of capital should be phased out by 
2020.53 The services market also remains fragment-
ed and, despite intentions to apply the principle of 
mutual recognition in some areas, some services 
(audio-visual, air transport) will be exempted from 
it. As a result, regulatory differences in each country 
are likely to remain, creating discriminatory restric-
tions. As shown by some assessments, although 
the synchronisation of business cycles among 
the three members of the CU is growing, signifi-
cant differences of business cycles remain and the 
economies are not sufficiently flexible to respond 
through internal adjustment to external  shocks.54 
This restricts opportunities for the realisation of a 
successful monetary union, though there are even 
more barriers to such an integration project in the 
political field, primarily due to the political regime in 
52 Adomeit, 1.
53 Wisniewska, 2.
54 Yulia Vymyatnina, “Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and 
Kazachstan – economic interdependence and resource 
curse influence”, BOFIT seminar, European University at St. 
Petersburg, 2012. 
Belarus, which is reluctant to give up its chances to 
manipulate the independent monetary policy and 
currency exchange rate. 
So while the process of the creation of the Eura-
sian Economic Union, which gained momentum 
at the beginning of 2010 with the declaration of 
the CU of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus and later 
with the preparation of new agreements for the 
Eurasian Economic Space, proceeds at a fairly rapid 
pace, it is too early to talk about smooth function-
ing of the CU let alone of other freedoms of the 
common market. Further integration process 
by removing barriers not only to movement of 
goods, but also to services, capital and labour 
will inevitably be confronted with the issue of 
common regulations, their enforcement, dispute 
settlement procedures and compliance with ju-
dicial decisions. In addition to elimination of trade 
barriers, harmonisation of market and, in particular, 
economic regulations, the greatest challenge to this 
process may be a new major attribute (compared 
to previous integration initiatives among CIS coun-
tries) – formation of supranational institutions and 
enforcement of their decisions. It should be noted 
that decisions of the Eurasian Economic Commis-
sion are binding and do not even have to be trans-
posed into the national law of the Eurasian Union 
states (like in the case of EU directives). Like in the 
EU, companies can bring actions into court against 
institutions of the union member states and court 
rulings are binding.  
When supranational institutions responsible for 
the preparation of the regulations for the union and 
control of their implementation start to function, 
questions arise as to which parties involved in the 
union will have the biggest influence on the content 
of general “rules of the game” and how all parties in-
volved will comply with the agreements, particularly 
given concerns about the rule of law and judicial 
independence in these countries regularly expressed 
by international observers. If decisions of the EEC 
and other supranational institutions are not ob-
served, the Eurasian Union will not function and 
will remain a fragmented free trade area with ele-
ments of common external trade policy. The pos-
sibility of such a scenario is exacerbated by the fact 
that Kazakhstan and Belarus are not members of the 
WTO and the latter’s chances of becoming a member 
25
of the WTO are remote. As noted, Russia’s progress 
in implementing the conditions agreed at accession 
to the WTO, as observed both by the EU and other 
WTO members, is questionable and therefore raises 
doubts as to how smooth the implementation of the 
rules of the Eurasian Union will be. 
Given the motives of member states of the Eura-
sian Union for participation in this project, it is pos-
sible to formulate the following three scenarios for 
further formation of this regional structure:
Scenario 1. The rapid and relatively successful 
integration of the Eurasian Economic Union (yet 
much later than the scheduled 2015).
 This scenario would mean integration “on paper”, 
i.e. political decisions (to remove barriers to services, 
capital and labour movement, harmonisation of such 
policy areas as competition), however, postponing 
implementation of the decisions for decades; can 
be in place in the next two years. Such a scenario 
is realistic, if Russia succeeded in finding the “key” 
which would encourage Kazakhstan to treat integra-
tion within the framework of the Eurasian Union as a 
security guarantee (perhaps post-2014 instability in 
Afghanistan, increase of China’s influence, etc.). Such 
a scenario would be the most disadvantageous with 
respect to EU’s interests:
•	 Possible expansion of the Eurasian Union 
– Ukraine’s membership in the Eurasian 
Union becomes real under the economic 
pressure (supply of energy resources at 
Russian domestic market prices) and the 
unfavourable domestic political environment 
for European integration. This would mean 
fundamental challenges to the agreements 
with the EU already reached within the 
Eastern Partnership format and perhaps even 
their suspension. 
•	 Negative effect on Kazakhstan’s negotiations 
for accession to the WTO: from sluggish 
negotiation schedule to suspension of 
negotiations.
•	 Negative effect on the EU’s leverage on 
Belarus – risk of serious challenges to 
applicability of economic sanctions, since EU 
- Belarus sanction policies become a matter 
of the whole Eurasian economic bloc. 
In this scenario, members of the Eurasian Union 
will keep pressing the EU to move from bilateral to 
inter-regional cooperation, given that regression of 
bilateral cooperation is expected.
Scenario 2. The Eurasian Union as yet another 
stagnating project of the CIS area.
This scenario describes the situation where 
implementation of the goals of integration is 
achieved neither by 2015 nor even over the next 
two decades and not even “on paper”, i.e. the goals 
are implemented inconsistently, only in some areas 
and completely depending on the electoral and 
economic cycles, which traditionally in the CIS space 
mark the strengthening of Russia’s influence. This 
is the most realistic scenario, which would allow 
member states (in particular, Belarus) to exchange 
their support for deepening of integration. On 
the other hand, such exchange also has its limits, 
because, as it is clear now, the Eurasian monetary 
union would not be favourable to Lukashenko’s 
regime, because the regime would lose an 
opportunity to “lift” its backward national economy 
by using monetary means. While this scenario would 
mean stagnation of the Eurasian Economic Union, it 
does not eliminate threats to the implementation of 
the Eastern Partnership: Ukraine may also have to 
regularly trade certain elements of integration with 
Russia in exchange for prices of energy resources, 
but without departing too far from the EU. Further 
consequences will depend entirely on the domestic 
political and economic situation in Ukraine – to 
what extent the ruling elite will be willing to and 
be able to afford to take the adjustement cost of 
integration with the EU as compared to certain 
sovereignty waiver to Russia.
This would mean selective cooperation for 
Eurasian relations with the EU: dealing with issues 
both on the bilateral level and the inter-regional 
level, as appropriate. Depending on how beneficial 
the cooperation with the EU would be for Eurasian 
Union countries, this format could be used as a tool 
for not accepting liberalisation requirements of the 
EU.
The fundamental problem with both scenarios 
is as follows: despite possible pressure to move to 
inter-regional cooperation between the EU and 
26
the Eurasian Union, such cooperation would not 
be justifiable for the EU:
•	 In the case of both scenarios, the Eurasian 
Union will still lack essential elements that 
would allow it to be seen as a balanced 
and voluntary regional integration project 
leading to the transformation of the member 
state economies; rather it will remain a non-
liberal project for simplification of the trade 
regime between non-democratic regimes. The 
transition to the inter-regional cooperation 
would mean that the EU would legitimise 
decisions of undemocratic regimes on 
delegation of sovereignty. 
•	 There is no reason to believe that the 
inter-regional cooperation would be more 
productive than bilateral formats, in which 
the EU has considerably more leverage.
Scenario 3. Reverting to bilateral cooperation 
and rejection of the idea of the Eurasian Economic 
Union. 
The necessary driving force behind this scenario 
is Russia’s decision to withdraw. This would be 
symptomatic of fundamental political changes 
in Russia or emergence of other instruments that 
would allow Russia to continue its domination in 
the region. Another possible option is that for some 
reason Belarus and Kazakhstan would become a 
burden intervening with Russia’s objectives (perhaps 
in seeking the bilateral visa-free regime with the EU 
or because of the position of Russia’s internal interest 
groups disagreeing with continuous subsidising of 
the Belarusian economy). From the EU’s point of 
view, this would be quite a positive scenario and 
would mean a better environment for the Eastern 
Partnership initiative, recovery of leverage in respect 
to Belarus, and the return to a more acceptable 
bilateral dialogue with Russia. 
V. (In)compatibility and competition be-
tween the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union 
Why is a Single Economic Space “from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok” unlikely? 
As observed by various authors, from the begin-
ning of the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative, Russian 
leaders viewed it with suspicion, as an attempt to 
limit Russia’s influence, an initiative against Russia.55 It 
should be noted though that after Putin had set out 
the vision of the Eurasian Economic Union in greater 
detail, there were no public hints about competi-
tion of this regional structure with the EU and the 
resulting dilemmas to the countries involved in the 
Eastern Partnership. Moreover, Putin stated, “entry 
into the Eurasian Union allows each of its partici-
pants to, more quickly and from a stronger position, 
integrate into Europe”.56 This can be linked to the 
pronouncement of another Putin vision a decade 
ago about “a Single Economic Space from Lisbon to 
Vladivostok”. Despite these visions, however, there 
is considerable doubt about the relationship 
between this regional structure and the EU, in 
particular regarding the possibility for Eastern 
Partnership countries to harmonise liberalisation 
of economic relations and adoption of regulations 
in both directions. An interesting coincidence that 
should be mentioned is that Putin announced the 
visions of the Eurasian Union about a week after the 
Eastern Partnership Summit in Warsaw. 
Leaders of the Eurasian Union and its member 
states declare their intentions to adopt EU regula-
tions, but this is still a theoretical possibility rath-
er than an advanced process. Adoption of the EU’s 
product quality, particularly production regula-
tions, will cost businesses of Eurasian countries 
and increase end-product prices. Income levels in 
these countries are much lower than those in the 
EU and the transposition of stricter regulations will 
be too costly, given that there is no prospect of EU 
membership which was the key motive for Lithuania 
and other Central and Eastern European countries 
to introduce more stringent EU norms. The main 
motive for the countries of the Eurasian Union to 
adopt EU standards would be the need for exporting 
companies in these countries to sell their products 
on the EU market. If adoption of EU rules is not di-
rectly related to the interests of exporters (when we 
speak about the standards governing manufacturing 
55 Ingmar Oldberg, “Russia’s great power strategy under Putin 
and Medvedev”. Stockholm: Swedish Institute of International 
Affairs, 2010, 6.
56 Adomeit, 2.
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process – environmental standards, but not about 
product quality standards) this will undoubtedly 
be a long process and it is not clear that it will ever 
be completed. Thus, it is hardly possible to talk 
about Putin’s advocated vision of Europe “from 
Lisbon to Vladivostok”. A less costly solution would 
be an agreement with the EU on mutual recogni-
tion of regulatory differences, encompassing only 
more prominent regulatory differences than those 
existing between EU Member States. This, however, 
is hardly likely due to traditional EU external policy 
based on the extension of EU regulatory norms and 
common democratic and market economy principles 
to other countries. 
The EU has consistently observed this principle 
not only with respect to candidates and countries 
negotiating for membership in the EU, but also with 
respect to neighbouring states pursuing closer rela-
tionship without a membership perspective as well 
as all WTO members where removal of non-tariff bar-
riers to trade is negotiated. The concept of a deep 
and comprehensive free trade area is based not 
only on removal of tariff barriers between the 
EU and a neighbouring country, but also on the 
adoption of a large part of EU regulations by that 
country. The EU’s objective to transpose regulatory 
norms not directly related to trade to Eastern Part-
nership countries incurs costs on businesses and in-
creases their product prices, but this has become a 
condition for such agreements. This EU policy, which 
is subject to criticism, was most obvious with respect 
to Georgia when it implemented far-reaching eco-
nomic reforms in 2005–2008. Georgia’s economy 
was liberalised more than economies in many EU 
Member States, but the EU insisted that Georgian 
authorities would not only carry out privatisation, 
deregulation and liberalisation reforms, but would 
also adopt EU regulations on competition, labour 
relations and other areas not directly related to trade. 
This indicates that any significant liberalisation 
of EU trade with Eastern neighbours and move-
ment of people, capital and services will inevi-
tably be associated with adoption of EU regula-
tions by neighbouring countries. Since old GOST 
or national technical standards and regulations are 
valid in the countries of the Eurasian Union, differ-
ences in regulations will remain for quite a long time 
and will function as non-tariff restrictions on trade 
between the EU and members of the Eurasian Union. 
Certainly, theoretically, it is possible to imagine a 
free trade, tariff-free  area between the EU and the 
Eurasian Union, but such a free trade area would 
be fragmented and limited to certain products 
that may be of no interest to Eurasian countries. 
Similarly, because of the pressure of interest groups 
in the EU countries, liberalisation of trade with Cen-
tral and Eastern European countries took place and 
there is a reason to believe that in this case interest 
groups would exert influence, given current rather 
complicated economic situation in some, particularly 
southern European countries. 
The “Wider Europe” scenario or the development 
of the Eurasian Economic Union? 
If the EU accepted Russia’s proposal to move from 
bilateral relations to EU relations with the Eurasian 
bloc, negotiations with a member of the Eurasian CU 
regarding free trade with the EU would be difficult 
because they would have to be conducted through 
the EEC and the agreement would be valid for all CU 
states. Considering EU policy towards Belarus, one of 
the members of the Eurasian Union, any intense dia-
logue, even outside the issue of trade liberalisation, 
is unlikely for political reasons. Thus, other members 
of the Eurasian Union, which tend to link observa-
tion of democratic principles and intensification of 
economic relations, would become hostages of Be-
larus’ domestic policy stance in relations with third 
countries. At the same time, Belarus would have a 
theoretical opportunity to restore relations with the 
EU without any policy change  through the back door, 
i.e. through the Eurasian Economic Union as a single 
economic unit. 
In any case, it is likely that the EU will not (and 
should not) treat the Eurasian Union as an equal 
partner until all its members become members 
of the WTO. So far it seems that in a few years, Ka-
zakhstan could become a WTO member and the 
prospects of Belarus joining the organisation are 
still very unclear. Kazakhstan’s and Belarus’ commit-
ment to fulfilling Russia’s WTO accession conditions 
may facilitate their preparation for membership in 
the WTO, but it will take time and the willingness 
of the Belarusian political regime to accept certain 
restrictions, preventing the possibility to manipulate 
economic regulation. 
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However, the offering of new types of trade 
agreements to Eastern Partnership countries based 
on the adoption of regulations and the progress in 
negotiating the DCFTA with Ukraine show that the 
EU is likely to disagree with the signing of a more 
simple free trade agreement. Considering the 
unlikely adoption of EU norms by the countries of 
the Eurasian Union, at least in the next few years, 
Eastern Partnership countries would inevitably 
have to choose between two different regulatory 
spaces. Therefore, despite the rhetoric of Russian 
leaders about the pan-European economic space, 
it does not match either Russia’s or the EU’s 
policies, which leads to the current dilemma for 
Eastern Partnership countries to choose between 
integration into the EU or closer relationship with 
the Eurasian Union. 
The first option, the “Wider Europe” scenario, 
for Eastern Partnership countries would mean a fair 
number of commitments to EU principles of democ-
racy and the application of relatively strict regulatory 
standards in exchange for access to a market with a 
population of 500 million, rapid growth opportunity 
and a possible promise of the prospect of member-
ship. The second option – development of the Eura-
sian Economic Union – could mean lower energy 
prices for some time, freer trade in the Eurasian space 
with a population of 170 million with significantly 
lower purchasing power than in the EU, lower poten-
tial for exchange of best practices, slower economic 
restructuring and strengthening of oligarchic and 
authoritarian management habits. 
Towards competition between two alternative 
integration spaces
Thus, the countries of Eastern Europe and Southern 
Caucasus participating in the Eastern Partnership 
programme have ended up between two integration 
spaces: European economic integration (through a 
network of enhanced free trade agreements with the 
EU) on the one hand and the Eurasian CU on the other 
hand. Through enhanced free trade agreements 
the EU in principle does not preclude further 
integration of these countries with each other, 
but once they become parties to the CU, they 
are deprived of the opportunity to have bilateral 
agreements with the EU. Thus, in practice, these 
countries must inevitably make a choice. 
The European Neighbourhood Policy (together 
with the Eastern Partnership initiative) provides 
that in exchange for political, economic and legal 
reforms (adoption of European rules), neighbouring 
countries of the EU will be offered preferential 
terms of participation in the EU internal market.57 
The EU decision to expand a network of free trade 
agreements will eventually transform the trade 
of all EU and partner countries by removing tariff 
barriers, unifying standards and customs procedures. 
Thus, participation in another CU, which involves 
countries which have not harmonised their 
legislative framework with EU requirements or 
their product standards, border control systems 
with EU standards, etc., becomes an objective that 
cannot be met, unless the Eurasian CU takes over 
an identical regulatory treatment. 
Meanwhile, the free trade regime that has so far 
been in place in the post-Soviet space, left the control 
of the depth of integration to each country and has 
not prevented CIS countries to join the EU economic 
space. The situation changed only in 2010 with 
launch of the CU of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. 
This union established not only a free trade area, 
but also a common structure of import duties and 
international trade procedures as well as started 
harmonisation of sanitary and other standards. 
Therefore, countries participating in the Eurasian 
CU are prevented from participation in the EU 
economic space (through enhanced free trade 
agreements), because in this case the tariff policy 
and trade standards would have to be reviewed. 
The involvement of the countries of Eastern Europe 
and Southern Caucasus (participating in the Eastern 
Partnership programme) in the Eurasian project 
would mean that they cannot plan a free trade space 
with the EU, because any such agreements should 
become the matter of the whole Eurasian Union. 
The following are the reasons why membership in 
the Eurasian CU is incompatible with participation in 
57 Marius Vahl, “A privileged partnership: EU-Russian 
relations in a comparative perspective”. DIIS Working Paper, 
3, 2006, 9–11, available at: <http://www.diis.dk/graphics/
Publications/WP2006/3_m_vahl_privileged_partnership.
pdf>.
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the enhanced free trade regime with the EU:58
•	 Countries who become members of the 
Eurasian CU lose independence in external 
trade policy. CU member states must not only 
agree on a common customs tariff, but also 
to develop a joint trade regime with third 
countries. Given the specific characteristics 
of the Eurasian institutions, in order to pass a 
decision or seek to develop a more favourable 
trade regime with the EU for any member of 
the CU, Russia’s approval is required. Thus, 
Russia gains leverage to control external trade 
policies of CU countries and their relations with 
the EU, for example, to block negotiations with 
the EU on an enhanced free trade agreement. 
It should be noted that the collaboration 
formula “3 +1”, which provides for a standard 
free trade regime without a common 
external tariff (which would meet Ukraine’s 
commitments to the WTO and the enhanced 
free trade agreement with the EU) and was 
suggested by Ukraine to Russia and other 
CU states was rejected. The same happened 
with the 2011 standard free trade agreement 
initiative within the CIS framework, when 
Russia found ways to block the agreement, 
which would have allowed Ukraine access 
to the CIS markets and participation in the 
enhanced free trade regime with the EU, from 
taking effect.59 On the one hand, this means 
that the traditional multivectoral policy 
of Ukraine and other Eastern European 
countries has reached its limits. On the 
other hand, it shows Russia’s interest in a 
model of the relationship with Ukraine and 
other Eastern European countries, which 
would allow Russia to control their policy 
with respect to the EU.
58 Guillaume Van der Loo, “Ukraine’s regional economic 
integration: stuck in the middle of its neighbours? A legal and 
polical analysis”. Eastern Partnership Community, 2011,
available at: <http://www.easternpartnership.org/
publication/economy/2011-11-04/ukraine-s-regional-
economic-integration-stuck-middle-its-neighbours-l>.
59 Olga Shumylo-Tapiola, “Ukraine at the Crossroads: Between 
the EU DCFTA & Customs Union”, Ifri Russia/NIS Center, 2012, 
22. 
•	 If Eurasian CU would be recognised by the 
EU, it would generally mean that as soon a 
country becomes a member of the Eurasian 
CU, the EU can no longer continue a dialogue 
or negotiate a mutual free trade agreement 
with that country, because the partner of 
both the dialogue and the agreement 
changes. From the moment a country becomes 
a member of the CU, the EU cannot negotiate 
an enhanced free trade agreement with it, 
because it has to negotiate it with the rest of the 
economic bloc (in this case, the Eurasian CU). 
Bearing in mind that the essential precondition 
for any negotiations with the EU on a free trade 
agreement is the country’s membership in 
the WTO, while at least two countries of the 
Eurasian CU (Belarus and Kazakhstan) are not 
members of the WTO, the scenario for EU–
Eurasian CU negotiations on the enhanced free 
trade regime is unlikely. If a country becomes 
a member of the CU after the enhanced free 
trade agreement with the EU takes effect, 
the agreement (or an integrated association 
agreement) would have to be denounced.
On the other hand, the incompatibility of 
the two integration spaces lies both in the 
mechanisms for setting the external tariff and 
the competition of different standards and 
regulations. It should be borne in mind that the 
EU seeks to model neighbouring countries according 
to its own pattern. Thus, the internal integration 
model within the EU creates a strong barrier for 
partner countries seeking to join the EU internal 
market. It should be noted that the EU’s support 
for the international deep and comprehensive free 
trade agreements is strongest when it comes to the 
expansion of EU regulatory standards outside the EU 
in order to maintain the EU’s competitive advantage 
in international markets.60 As a result, free trade 
agreements proposed to EU’s partner countries are 
no longer based solely on the tariff reduction logic, 
because they cover a broader range of issues, such 
as removal of non-tariff barriers, liberalisation of the 
60 Thomas Diez, “Normative Power as Hegemony”. Conference 
presentation 2011 EUSA Biennial International Conference, 
Boston, accessed on 3–5 March 2011, <http://euce.org/
eusa/2011/papers/7l_thomas.pdf>.
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services sector, elimination of the state’s protectionist 
measures, favourable conditions for foreign direct 
investment, etc. So the agreements acquire the 
comprehensive nature61 and partner countries have 
a status of a “political successor”. Thus, by offering 
free trade agreements, the EU requires from partner 
countries economic modernisation, furthermore, 
modernisation with high EU standards in such areas 
as sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards, technical 
regulations, public procurement, competition policy 
and state aid. 
Partner countries can get access to the EU internal 
market only when they adopt EU standards, rules 
of origin, certification procedures, etc.62 In other 
words, first, they have to adopt the standards, 
because this is a condition for access to the EU 
market. In addition, in exchange for the free trade 
regime, countries will be required to transpose the 
required EU reform package. It provides for the state 
grant systems and abandoning of protectionist 
measures, implementation of which would 
inevitably change interaction between the state 
and business. Meanwhile, many economic sectors 
of post-Soviet countries are still characterized 
bystate protection, and they are very sensitive to 
international competition. Bearing in mind that 
there is the business-politics nexus in the post-Soviet 
space and therefore the political system in the post-
Soviet space is strongly influenced by oligarchic 
business groups, the EU rules may become too high 
a bar for the integration of post-Soviet countries 
into the EU internal market (because essentially 
all requirements – from adoption of technical 
standards to fundamental structural reforms – must 
be implemented simultaneously). 
61 Enrique Valerdi Rodriguez, “The European Union Free Trade 
Agreements: Implications for Developing Countries”. RIE 
Working Paper, 8, 2009, 5–6, available at:
<http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/wcm/connect/
a85925004f018b93b9dafd3170baead1/WP8-2009_Valerdi_
EUFTA_Developing_Countires.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CACHEI
D=a85925004f018b93b9dafd3170baead1>.
62 Veronika Movchan and Ricardo Giucci, “Quantitative 
Assessment of Ukraine’s Regional Integration Options: DCFTA 
with European Union vs. Customs Union with Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan”, Institute for Economic Research and Policy 
Consulting, Berlin/Kyiv, 2011, 5.
The importance of different standards and regula-
tions becomes particularly apparent when the bar of 
the rules for adapting to an alternative centre of 
gravity to that of the EU (in this case, the Eurasian 
CU) is much lower than EU requirements. GOST 
standards still dominate in the Eurasian CU as one 
of the main categories of standards of the former 
USSR. Today this is the cross-border standard for the 
CIS.63 This system includes Ukraine and other Eastern 
Partnership countries. This indicates that adaptation 
to Eurasian CU standards for these countries would 
not create any barriers or convergence costs. In other 
words, if the EU offers convergence towards high 
standards that can cause “shock therapy” to busi-
ness groups operating under old business pat-
terns and schemes, so the CU does not require 
any fundamental reorganisation or adaptation 
to high quality standards and regulations. 
In addition, post-Soviet countries share not only 
the common formal system of standards, but also 
informal rules (the business-politics nexus, oligarchic 
tendencies, etc.). Membership in the Eurasian CU, 
unlike the enhanced free trade regime with the EU 
and its requirements, does not encourage giving up 
these informal rules. This shows that participation 
of partner countries in the enhanced free trade 
regime proposed by the EU is incompatible with 
membership in the Eurasian CU not only because 
of the integrated external tariff policy, but also 
because of the relationship between different 
standards and regulations of the system and 
the informal and formal rules in these different 
integration areas.  
VI. Development opportunities of the 
Eurasian CU: Ukrainian and Moldovan cases
Ukraine – at the crossroad of economic policy 
and geopolitical choice 
The most important issue concerning the 
choice by Eastern Partnership countries between 
integration into the EU and participation in the 
creation of the Eurasian Union may be illustrated 
by the case of Ukraine. Ukraine, unlike Belarus, 
63 Shumylo-Tapiola, “The Eurasian Customs Union: Friend and 
Foe of the EU?”, 14.
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which has essentially determined its direction of 
integration, remains at the geopolitical crossroads 
of choice, and the choice will determine not only 
trade flows with neighbours, but also the pace and 
direction of structural reforms. Ukraine is the most 
important country in the EU Eastern Partnership 
programme, the first to have received an invitation 
to economic integration and to have completed 
negotiations concerning an enhanced free trade 
agreement (DCFTA). On the other hand, Ukraine 
is strategically important to Russia, which seeks to 
restore its lost influence in the region and to ensure 
stability for its new quality economic union.64 
In 2008, Ukraine became a member of the WTO and 
started negotiations with the EU on the Association 
Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area Agreement. These negotiations indicated 
Ukraine’s intention to adopt around 70% of the EU’s 
legal regulations governing not only trade, but 
also energy, transport, environmental and other 
areas related with the EU Single Market. At the 
end of 2011, when the time to sign EU–Ukraine 
agreements approached, Putin announced 
the vision of the Eurasian Union. Meanwhile, 
the EU suspended the signing and ratification 
of agreements with Ukraine due to Ukraine’s 
domestic political situation and the legal action 
against Yulia Tymoshenko as well as against some 
other members of the previous government. As 
EU–Ukraine relations began to deteriorate, Russia 
significantly intensified its efforts to use energy links, 
primarily because of the dependence of Ukraine 
industry on Russia for supplies of less expensive 
natural gas and oil and the significant income from 
transit of Russian products through Ukraine, in order 
to convince the Ukrainian leadership to reconsider 
its position on participation in the Eurasian Union. 
Launching of the Nord Stream and particularly the 
planned South Stream may also be exploited as 
bargaining tools, threatening to cut natural gas transit 
through Ukraine along with Ukraine’s transit income. 
Russia also offered a variety of sectoral agreements 
to enhance cooperation with Ukraine, although 
Ukraine may not be joining the Eurasian Union 
64 Shumyla-Tapiola, “Ukraine at the Crossroads: Between the 
EU DCFTA & Customs Union”, 4.
immediately, but creating conditions for its gradual 
integration. In other words, rapid development of 
the Eurasian CU prior to the completion of the first 
EU negotiations with Ukraine on the association and 
trade liberalisation agreements shows that the EU is 
no longer “the only game in town”.65
Ukraine’s political leaders continue their support 
for the EU Partnership project; however, the final 
decision of the country will be determined by the 
cost-benefit analysis of the large corporate groups 
that form a nexus with the political elite. Big busi-
ness in Ukraine is fragmented – the majority wants to 
preserve its privileged trade relations within the CIS 
space, others focus on the EU market. This reflects 
in Ukraine’s attitude: it has tried to maintain its 
current non-obliging position and cooperate with 
both integration spaces. However, the compre-
hensive free trade regime with the EU and mem-
bership in the CU are incompatible. Ukraine tried 
to manoeuvre through the “3 +1” integration model 
with the CU (proposing a standard free trade agree-
ment), but Russia rejected the proposal and thus re-
stricted the traditional Ukraine multi-vectorial policy. 
Trends in Ukraine’s trade with the EU and the 
Eurasian Economic Union 
The EU and CU countries are the biggest trade 
partners of Ukraine and account for about 2/3 of all 
Ukrainian trade turnover. The dynamics of the past 
decade show that prior to the 2008 economic cri-
sis in Ukraine, the role of the EU in trade increased 
while that of today’s Eurasian countries decreased. 
Later, however, increasing energy prices and the 
change in the demand of the recovering economy 
determined the turn to the current Eurasian CU mar-
ket. In 2000–2010, exports to the EU fell by 7.7% (to 
25.4%) and the share of imports from the EU – by 
5.3% (to 31.4%), while exports to and imports from 
CU countries increased by 5.9% (32.3%) and 9% (42%) 
respectively.66 
65 Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2.
66 Veronika Movchan and Ricardo Giucci, “Quantitative 
Assessment of Ukraine’s Regional Integration Options: DFCTA 
with European Union vs. Customs Union with Russia, Belarus 
and Kazachstan”, Berlin/Kyiv, 2011, 2.
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Ukraine exports energy, agricultural products, 
chemicals, and iron and steel to the EU and imports 
a variety of machinery, vehicles and equipment, 
agricultural products, textiles, and clothing.67 
Trade with CU countries is much less diversified 
and covers mainly natural resources (imports) 
and machinery and vehicles (exports). Traditional 
business dependency relations with the CIS markets 
are of vital importance to this direction of trade. 
The volumes of trade in services with both unions 
are almost the same, but the most telling indicator 
is that of high technology trade which is almost 
two times higher in the EU direction than the CU 
(40.2% and 23.9%).68 Differences in the structure 
of trade with the EU and the Eurasian Economic 
Union partially reflect the choice of integration 
direction: in the short-term choose either costly 
economic and technological modernisation or 
preservation of the existing domestic economic 
structure.
Comprehensive free trade with the EU vs. mem-
bership in the Eurasian CU
Evaluation of the effect of the comprehensive free 
trade agreement with the EU on Ukraine usually fo-
cuses on advantages. First, welfare growth – trade 
with the EU means a greater variety of products to 
consumers, although due to stringent safety require-
ments products will be more costly, and new busi-
ness opportunities, which in the long term mean the 
growth of income per capita. Second, the agreement 
would guarantee duty-free access to the world’s larg-
est market –EU’s GDP at purchasing power parity 
is 5.67 times that of the Eurasian Union, while the 
acceding country’s economic benefit depends on 
the size of the host market. Third, harmonisation of 
the national legislation with EU regulations would 
create a legal environment for business acceptable 
to foreign (primarily Western) investors. 
67 DG Trade, “Ukraine. EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the 
World”, 2012, available at: <http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/
docs/2006/september/tradoc_113459.pdf >.
68 Veronika Movchan and Ricardo Giucci, “Quantitative 
Assessment of Ukraine’s Regional Integration Options: DFCTA 
with European Union vs. Customs Union with Russia, Belarus 
and Kazachstan”, Berlin/Kyiv, 2011, 2.
On the other hand, the comprehensive free trade 
with the EU may lead to problems caused not so 
much by the EU, but by economic backwardness 
and the economic structure of Ukraine. Elimination 
of tariff barriers (around 95 % of all EU tariffs) and 
reduction of non-tariff barriers would increase com-
petition in the domestic market, which would pose 
a threat to local producers enjoying protectionist 
support. It is true that the transition to free trade 
would take place by phasing out tariff barriers and 
retaining annual export quotas for Ukraine for stra-
tegically important production: 1.6 million tonnes 
of grain, meat, sugar and their products.69 Adop-
tion of EU standards and EU legal framework will 
inevitably result for Ukraine in high adjustment 
costs, because the EU will require adapting to its 
rules and quality standards prior to opening free 
trade. It would be easier for Ukraine to adjust if the 
EU was primarily focusing on the development of 
free trade, and then transition phases would be es-
tablished for adoption of European rules and qual-
ity standards. High EU internal standards increase 
the cost of adaptation for Ukraine, especially in the 
short term. 
The prospect of membership in the Eurasian Un-
ion also has its own advantages and disadvantages. 
As far as disadvantages are concerned, first, the pros-
pect of losing an independent trade policy should 
be emphasised. The Eurasian Economic Commission 
would conduct negotiations with third countries and 
other trading blocs bypassing the member state capi-
tals (which de facto would mean Russia’s leverage 
in controlling Ukraine’s trade policy). Furthermore, 
while establishment of the free trade zone with 
the EU implies modernisation by adopting costly 
EU quality standards and legal framework, mem-
bership in the Eurasian Union would mean higher 
costs for investment from countries outside the 
union and subsequently smaller investment and 
innovation flows.70 
69 Veronika Movchan and Volodymyr Shportyuk, “EU-Ukraine 
DCFTA: the Model for Eastern Partnership Regional Trade 
Cooperation”, Warsaw: Center for Social and Economic 
Research, 2012, 12–13.
70 Veronika Movchan and Ricardo Giucci, “Quantitative 
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with European Union vs. Customs Union with Russia, Belarus 
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Another economic disadvantage of Ukraine’s 
accession to the CU is the WTO factor. Unlike 
Eurasian CU countries (Kazakhstan, Belarus), 
Ukraine is a member of the WTO. Membership in 
the WTO means that Kiev is committed to reduce 
tariff rates to the level negotiated with the WTO. 
Ukraine also joined various sectoral agreements 
on the reduction on tariffs for many product 
groups. By joining the CU, Ukraine would have 
to review its tariff commitments agreed in the 
negotiations with the WTO and align them with 
those that CU countries (Belarus, Kazakhstan) 
will negotiate during their accession to the WTO. 
Because of adjustment of WTO commitments, 
Ukraine will have to compensate the loss incurred 
by other WTO members. The estimated amount 
of compensations would be USD 1.9 billion.71 This 
leads to the conclusion that the option of Ukraine’s 
membership in the Eurasian CU should be 
considered only when all CU countries become 
members of the WTO or rely on the assumption 
that USD 1.9 billion would be covered by Russia 
interested in Ukraine’s accession. 
Eurasian Economic Union: what incentives does 
Russia offer to Ukraine? 
The majority of the arguments encouraging 
Ukraine to choose membership in the Eurasian Union 
are related to possible elimination of the domestic 
market protection measures by Russia and the sale 
of Russian oil and gas to Ukraine without export 
duties. On the other hand, membership in the CU 
does not guarantee energy supplies at Russian 
domestic market prices, because exemptions from 
the CU regime (for example, export duty) still apply 
to trade in energy resources. Elimination of export 
duties in the trade in energy resources can only be 
a discount or an incentive offered by Russia on a 
bilateral basis (as in the case of Belarus), but not 
a direct consequence of CU membership. 
After Ukraine’s accession to the CU, Russia will have 
an opportunity to eliminate export duties on energy 
resources for Ukraine, but the sale of natural resources 
to Ukraine at Russian domestic market prices would 
71 Ibid., 9. 
be a daunting decision for Russia. On the one hand, 
discounts in trading energy resources would be a 
truly effective tool, because energy imports in 2010 
accounted for 67% of the total imports from Russia 
and, according to Ukraine’s minister of economy, 
would allow Ukraine to save USD 3–3.5 billion per 
year only on elimination of export duties on gas.72 
However, it is more realistic to speak about a 10% 
discount which would make the price for gas equal 
to that paid by Russia’s big EU buyers and amounting 
to USD 400/1,000 m³ compared to USD 426/1,000 m³ 
paid by Ukraine for gas in Q3 2012. 
On the other hand, Russia itself is stuck with a 
dilemma  over its desire to maximise profits from 
oil and gas exports and to lure Ukraine to the 
Eurasian Economic Union dominated by Russia. 
It should be noted that intern al Russian business 
interest groups, in particular, interest groups in 
Gazprom, may be disinterested in the implementation 
of Russia’s geopolitical interests at the expense of 
export profits. Ukraine is too big a market to allow 
tangible discounts without major economic loss. 
Practice shows that Putin also gives priority to profit. 
In the gas sale agreement for Ukraine concluded in 
2009, high gas prices turned even relatively pro-
Russian Ukrainian political elite groups against 
Russia.73 Moreover, given that the 2009 agreement 
on gas prices was concluded because Russia had 
cut gas supplies to Ukraine and, therefore to Central 
and Southern European countries, the complexity of 
energy and political dynamics becomes even more 
evident.74
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com/2011/04/09/strategic-flexibility-a-key-issue-for-ukraine-
in-trade-relations-with-russia-and-the-eu/>. 
73 Andreas Umland, “ES-Ukrainos-Rusijos trikampis, ‘Šiaurės 
srautas’ ir Rytų Europos ateitis” [The EU-Ukraine-Russia 
triangle, Nord Stream and the future of Eastern Europe”], Kyiv, 
2011, available at: <http://www.geopolitika.lt/?artc=4956>. 
74 Laurynas Jonavičius, “Dujos vėl teka, bet padėtis Ukrainoje 
nesikeičia” [Gas flows again, but the situation in Ukraine does 
not change], Vilnius: Eastern Europe Studies Centre, 2009, 1.
34
The role of Ukraine as an energy transit country 
is not only conditioned to its membership in the 
Eurasian CU, but certainly also associated with the 
penetration of Russian capital to strategic sectors 
of Ukraine’s economy. For example, the Ukrainian 
gas pipeline system remains in the hands of the state-
owned enterprise and for the past decade has been 
a perfect target for investment for the Russian gas 
giant Gazprom. In other words, the status of Ukraine 
as a transit country and its dependence on Russian 
raw materials may eventually be incompatible with 
interests of sovereign Ukraine. 
The 2012 analysis conducted by the St. Petersburg 
Centre for Integration Studies and the Eurasian 
Development Bank states that the scenario of 
Ukraine’s accession to the Eurasian CU by 2030 
promises a 6-7% higher GDP growth than in the case 
of the status quo scenario. Such growth is based 
on an increase in exports to the countries of the 
Common Economic Space (primarily Russia and 
in transit traffic as well as less costly raw materials 
for Ukrainian industry.75 These benefits that do 
not directly result from membership in the Eurasian 
Economic Union, but from possible Russia’s rebates 
and incentives, are essential in many calculations 
stating the advantage of the Eurasian Union. 
It can be said that the Ukrainian choice between 
the enhanced free trade regime with the EU or the 
membership in the Eurasian union is basically a 
choice between long-term and short-term gains. 
The comprehensive free trade with the EU would 
not only mean adaptation to more expensive 
EU standards (costs in the short term), but also 
modernisation of Ukrainian economy and a 
qualitative leap in economy and trade in the 
medium and long term. The Eurasian Economic 
Union does not require major changes in Ukraine and 
higher standards, but promises Russian discounts 
in the energy sector. These potential discounts and 
incentives should be viewed by Ukraine through the 
prism of national sovereignty. 
75 Eurasian Development Bank’s Saint Petersburg Centre for 
Integration Studies, Ukraine and the Customs Union. Report 1, 
2012, 29. 
Moldova’s integration dilemmas
In terms of choice of direction of economic 
integration, Moldova is in a similar situation to that 
of Ukraine. The country has long sought a balance 
between free trade with the EU and better trading 
terms with the CIS space. For nearly a decade (2001–
2009), Moldova was ruled by the Communist Party 
that had all the leverage (including the constitutional 
majority) to turn the country’s integration eastward, 
but this scenario has not been selected.76 Moreover, it 
was under the Communist rule in 2005, that Moldova’s 
parliament announced integration into the EU as a 
strategic goal. Thus, European integration has been 
formulated as a strategic goal of both domestic and 
foreign policy and further developments in Moldova 
became an integral part of the progressive and 
irreversible process of European integration.
Since 2009, when the majority in the parliament 
was won by the Alliance for European Integration, 
the pro-European political orientation was openly 
declared. In October 2011, Moldova signed a 
protocol on accession to the EU Energy Cooperation 
Agreement and since 2012, requirements of the EU 
Third Energy Package (unbundling of the vertically 
integrated monopolies) have been applied. These 
specific steps showing sovereignty and aspirations 
for European integration are unacceptable for Russia. 
As a result, Russia has demanded from Chisinau to 
denounce this agreement in order any negotiations 
for less costly Russian gas import prices could be 
possible. These negotiations for a 30% less expensive 
gas illustrate most vividly the dead end of the policy 
pursued hitherto – it is no longer possible to combine 
European integration and pragmatic interests in 
Russia today. The incentive offered to Moldova by 
Russia – less costly gas – also has its price. This is 
best known by the Belarusian political regime which 
is gradually losing control of the country’s gas 
pipelines and other strategic objects, and eventually 
–sovereignty. 
76 Leonid Litra, “European Integration of the Republic of 
Moldova – Is It Still a National Consensus?”, Moldova’s Foreign 
Policy Statewatch, Issue 39, 2001, 3.
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Comparison of two integration alternatives 
When assessing economic integration alternatives 
available to Moldova, it is important to compare 
macroeconomic indicators of the EU and the Eurasian 
CU (2011):77
Criterion CU (USD) EU (USD)
Number of consumers 165 million 503 million
Total GDP/GDP per 
capita 2.74 trillion/14.866 15.39 trillion/34.000
Foreign trade volumes 1.021 trillion 3.791 trillion
Annual domestic 
investment
603 billion
22% GDP)
2.88 trillion
(18.7 % GDP)
Home credits 854 billion 29 trillion
Annual R&D
expenditure 15.3 billion 239.7 billion
Foreign Direct
Investment 435.38 billion 7.972 trillion
The comparative analysis shows that the Eurasian 
CU offers Moldova a consumer market that is three 
times smaller, a total GDP that is 5.6 times lower 
and twice as little GDP per capita, 3.7 times smaller 
foreign trade volumes, 4.7 times lower domestic 
investment, a 34 times smaller credit market, 15.6 
times lower annual R&D expenditure, 18 times 
lower foreign direct investment. In addition, unlike 
the multi-centred EU, the CU is economically and 
politically dominated by Russia. Russian citizens 
account for 83.6% of the CU population, its GDP 
accounts for 86.8% of the total CU GDP, foreign trade 
volumes – 79.2%, foreign currency reserves – 93.4%, 
and domestic trade - 65.2%.
The attractiveness of either alternative to Moldova 
is determined by other economic circumstances 
partly coinciding with the factors already discussed 
in the case of Ukraine. In the event of an enhanced 
free trade regime with the EU, Moldova would have 
to carry out an expensive process of modernisation 
and adapt to EU quality standards, a legal framework 
for business, and production standards for export. 
77 Victor Chirila.
Agricultural sector is likely to require a most 
costly modernisation, as adoption of sanitary 
and phyto-sanitary standards according to 
various estimates will increase production costs 
by 1.5–8%.78 However, even under the maximum 
estimate of costs, the benefit of the EU market 
access remains beneficial79, even taking into 
account that the enhanced free trade regime with 
the EU is unlikely to cover full liberalisation of 
trade in agricultural products.80 
Moldova is entirely dependent on a single supplier 
of energy resources; thus European integration and 
implementation of the EU Third Energy Package are 
required for modernisation of its energy sector.81 At 
present, Gazprom holds 50% of the shares in Mol-
dova’s largest gas company Moldovagaz supplying 
Russian gas on Moldova’s territory. Moldova’s debt 
to Gazprom reaches USD 4.1 billion (together with 
the debt of the separatist Transnistria regime also 
assigned to Moldova). The debt to Gazprom is higher 
than that of any republic of the former USSR. The 
debt settlement is still one of Russia’s conditions be-
fore negotiating gas price discounts for Moldova. 
Thus, in Moldova’s case, Russia has even more 
leverage in the energy field than in Ukraine as 
far as the direction of the country’s economic in-
tegration is concerned. 
Moldova’s accession to the Eurasian CU would 
mean increased external tariffs and therefore 
declining competitiveness of Moldovan exports. 
Moldova is a very open economy and accession 
to the CU would cause a major change in the tariff 
regime, much more than the enhanced free trade 
regime with the EU would do. Trade restrictions 
78 Prohnitchi Valeriu, “Strategic Comparison of Moldova’s 
Integration Options: Deep and Comprehensive Economic 
Integration with the EU versus the Accession to the Russia-
Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union”, Economic Analysis and 
Forecast Paper, No. 3, 2012, 12. 
79 Under current production costs, Moldovan agricultural 
production is 36% less expensive than the EU average.
80 FAOSTAT, available at: <http://faostat3.fao.org/home/
index.html#DOWNLOAD>. 
81 Ana Popa et al., “A free trade area between the Repbulic of 
Moldova and the European Union: feasibility, perspectives 
and potential impact”, Chisinau, 2009, 86. 
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would reduce exports in all directions, production 
capacity and consumption, as well as funds 
available for technological development. Most 
importantly, Moldova, a member of the WTO since 
2001, by becoming a member of the CU would have 
to breach its economic commitments and therefore 
to pay compensations. In addition, due to withdrawal 
from the agreed commitments, other countries may 
respond by raising import duties for goods from 
Moldova and the EU may be forced to denounce 
unilateral tariff preferences. 82 Assessing the 30% 
discount on Russian gas supplies as a bureaucratic 
and hardly likely stimulus, negative consequences 
of membership in the CU could not be outweighted 
by any positive incentives arising directly from 
membership in the Eurasian CU.
VII. The issue of recognition and non-recog-
nition of the Eurasian Economic Union
Since the declaration of a new phase of integra-
tion and launch of EEC by Eurasian CU, the issue of 
recognition of the EEC and the emerging Eurasian 
Economic Union has been raised vigorously. It was 
first mentioned by Russian officials, however, there 
has been hardly any detailed analysis on the mean-
ing of the very fact of the recognition of such su-
pranational structure. 
There are no major doubts or discussions about 
the fact of the emerging structure in the EU’s eastern 
neighbourhood, which may currently be described as 
the emerging CU. It can be defined by the following 
objective criteria. First, there is a common external 
tariff, although it does not apply to all goods. Second, 
there is a common CU Customs Code, which should 
guarantee common import procedures, classifica-
tion of goods, customs valuation, and other similar 
aspects. Third, development of common CU stand-
ards and technical regulations is in progress. Fourth, 
CU countries gradually abolish mutual cross-border 
controls and other restrictions on the movement of 
goods within the CU. 
82 Valeriu Prohnitchi, “Strategic Comparison of Moldova’s 
Integration Options: Deep and Comprehensive Economic 
Integration with the EU versus the Accession to the Russia-
Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union”, Economic Analysis and 
Forecast Paper, No. 3, 2012, 12.
At the same time, creation of the CU is still in 
progress and member states still apply export 
duties for trading certain products within CU; the 
countries do not apply unified export duties to 
third countries. In addition, national standards for 
certification of imported goods remain valid next 
with newly prepared standards. For example, it is still 
possible for a single CU country to introduce a new 
utilisation/recycling charge on imported cars, etc. 
In 2012, the supranational Eurasian Economic Union 
Commission was formed. Despite that, the countries 
are still analysing further integration opportunities 
and possible trajectories in macroeconomic and 
perhaps fiscal policy areas. The beginning of the new 
and further mutual integration phase is set for 2015, 
when the economic union will be launched. From 
the very beginning, this deadline seemed unrealistic 
as to whether this regional integration structure will 
succeed to achieve in just a few years what took the 
EU a few decades to reach. Clearly this date will only 
mean a beginning of a new integration phase or 
perhaps just the final consolidation of the CU 
integration phase. The fast approaching deadline 
means a necessity to codify and organise dozens of 
currently valid mutual agreements which regulate 
activities of the Eurasian CU. Before this date, legal acts 
in such areas as competition law, intellectual property 
protection and public procurement currently valid in 
CU countries will need to be analysed. Over the next 
two years until 2015, the work will be continued by 
analysing in greater detail not only possible areas of 
further economic integration, but also models for 
further procedures; possible common platforms will 
be proposed, draft agreements and legal acts will be 
prepared. 
The decision regarding the main areas of the 
integration process by the Supreme Eurasian 
Economic Union Council confirms the above action 
plan. This decision obliges governments of all 
the three CU countries together with the EEC to 
prepare a Draft Treaty on the Economic Union by 
1 May 2014. In addition to several other aims, this 
document also stipulates the aim to entrench the 
status of the Eurasian Economic Union as a fully-
fledged international organisation. It follows that 
the aim of the ongoing integration process is not 
only economic, but also political integration of 
the countries of this union. Furthermore, while 
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the limits of the potential political integration are 
not yet clear, efforts of both the representatives 
of Russia and the EEC to achieve and consolidate 
political recognition of the emerging structure 
have become more intense. 
Practical aspects of recognition of the Eurasian 
Economic Union 
When discussing the underlying motives for 
gaining international recognition of the Eurasian 
Economic Union, it is necessary to answer the 
following questions: is the creation of the Eurasian 
Economic Union also a political process leading 
to establishment of a new object of international 
relations which needs recognition and support from 
third countries and international organisations? Or 
perhaps the creation of the Eurasian Economic 
Union is just another example of deeper 
regional economic integration, so recognition of 
this structure is necessary for further rational and 
pragmatic communication with third countries and 
international organisations? 
Recognition of this regional structure has been 
very actively pursued of late. It should be noted 
that the first such attempt as Russia suspended 
negotiations regarding WTO accession in 2009, and 
would only continue accession as a member of the CU 
– failed. Later, the EEC signed cooperation protocols 
with the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe, which shows that the new 
structure has already taken its first steps towards 
political recognition. In addition, at its 67th session, 
the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a 
resolution prepared by Russia, which proposes to 
establish cooperation between the United Nations 
and the Eurasian Union, and efforts to strengthen 
regional integration within the framework of the 
Eurasian Customs Union have been recognised. 
This recognition by the organisations of the UN 
system has hardly made any essential difference, 
because all three current CU countries were 
already members of these organisations. It is 
also unclear which model will be used to represent 
these three CU countries in further work of these 
international organisations and to what extent the 
EEC will participate in it too. 
At the same time it should be emphasised 
that the new economic structure will in the 
future influence the WTO accession process of 
the other two CU countries. As for Kazakhstan, as 
has already been mentioned its participation in the 
emerging CU not only delayed, but also complicated 
WTO membership. This was due to Kazakhstan’s 
membership in the CU and because it was forced to 
raise import duties and will continue to be forced 
to introduce other protective measures, primarily 
reflecting Russia’s interests. These actions taken by 
Kazakhstan and the planned economic integration 
will affect areas of the economy negotiated at the 
time of accession to the WTO; such areas include 
trade in services, investment regime, protection 
of intellectual property, public procurement, etc., 
Kazakhstan’s WTO membership may be delayed from 
a few years to the longer-term. 
If Belarusian negotiations on WTO accession 
were to begin, there will be many more unanswered 
questions and problems concerning participation in 
the CU. The accession process has not taken place for 
many years, while declarations of Belarusian officials 
that they will quickly meet formal requirements of 
the WTO because Russia has become a member 
of the WTO and its commitments are already 
implemented on the CU level will definitely not 
be sufficient. To provide such impetus to the 
accession process a favourable or at least a 
neutral attitude of the international community 
towards Belarusian membership in the WTO is 
required, not to mention the country’s significant 
efforts to carry out economic reforms.  Increased 
institutional capacities are required to negotiate, 
or at least try to copy Russia’s WTO membership 
commitments, and also capacity to implement 
these obligations.
On the other hand, as Belarus actually starts 
to pursue WTO membership, there is no grounds 
to assume that copying current Russia’s WTO 
commitments will suffice for Minsk. On the 
contrary, the EU should use both Belarus 
and Kazakhstan WTO accession negotiations 
for further opening of the entire market of 
the Eurasian Economic Union for goods and 
services and reduction of existing trade barriers 
(conditions agreed by Russia must not become 
a common smallest denominator, while the 
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negotiations must be viewed as a-country-at-
a-time process). 
It should be highlighted that if the Eurasian CU 
or Economic Union would continue to strengthen 
measures of market protection (or apply measures 
inconsistent with the WTO), accession of any new 
members to the Eurasian Economic Union, primar-
ily of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Moldova, and Ukraine, 
which are or will soon become full members of the 
WTO, will immediately mean renegotiation/review of 
their conditions and commitments assumed during 
negotiations for WTO membership and/or require-
ment to pay considerable compensations. 
The relationship between the Eurasian Economic 
Union regulation and the Energy Charter Treaty 
is none-the-less interesting, as energy policy is 
expected to be a field of joint coordination in the 
future. Before the EU proceeds with recognition 
of the Eurasian Economic Union, the position of 
Eurasian Economic Union towards the Energy 
Charter must be inspected, and recognition 
of Eurasian Economic Union should be at least 
partially conditional on Russia’s return to the 
regulatory sphere of the Energy Charter. 
The supranational EEC has not been 
representing the CU countries jointly so far, 
and is not likely to be engaged in negotiations 
in the near future. Russian Federation seems to 
remain the main negotiator. This is evident from 
the course of the ongoing free trade negotiations 
between Russia (and/or the Eurasian CU) and the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries, 
New Zealand and Egypt. Despite the fact that the 
negotiation started to include only Russia, the EFTA 
and New Zealand opted to continue negotiations 
with all three partners later in the course. However, 
Russian negotiators continue to represent Russia and 
the Eurasian CU, rather than vice versa. Furthermore, 
Russia’s disapproval to market opening and several 
other conditions related to the liberalisation of the 
agricultural sector have prevented the Eurasian CU 
from completing negotiations with New Zealand. 
Free trade talks with Vietnam that will begin 
next year will pose a new challenge to the EEC’s 
institutional capacity. Strengthening of the 
administrative capacity of EEC might also imply 
increased interest for technical cooperation with 
EU institutions (Commission directorates and other 
agencies). This can be seen as a risk (even technical 
cooperation should not be performed “automatically”, 
as it implicitly legitimises activities of the Eurasian 
Economic Union, although there has not been any 
political decision on legitimisation yet). It is crucial 
that political or technical cooperation with the 
Eurasian Union as an organisation (by EU member 
states or EU institutions, e. g. directorates of the 
European Commission, etc.) are properly monitored 
and kept down to the minimum required for the 
dissemination of principles and norms which are 
the basis of the EU law.
Russian officials have suggested that 
negotiations on a new EU-Russia Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement should be replaced by 
negotiations of a regional agreement between 
the EU and the Eurasian Union. By adopting such 
a position Russia is showing its objective to scale 
down the content of negotiations, to postpone 
decision-making, and to “dilute” the content of 
its commitments. 
In light of the repeated statements by Russia 
that it will not negotiate regarding the transfer of 
commitments undertaken during the WTO accession 
negotiations (known as “WTO-plus” obligations) to 
a bilateral agreement with the EU, it is unlikely that 
negotiation could be more successful. First of all, it 
must be clarified to what extent Russia is ready 
to open its market of services or public services 
to the EU. While there are no answers to these 
questions, EU foreign ministers should not bother 
looking to solve the dilemma of who to negotiate 
with – Russia or the EEC. 
Since the entry into force of Russian WTO 
membership the EEC seems to be instrumental 
in cases there is an interest not to fulfil Russian 
obligations under WTO membership negotiations 
(for example, by introducing a common external 
tariff). The EEC does not seem capable of affecting 
new protectionist measures introduced by Russia (for 
example, the vehicle recycling/utilisation charge) or, 
furthermore, fails to fulfil its functions de jure and 
has not yet taken over competences from Russian 
authorities (for example, a ban on livestock imports 
from the EU). 
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 VIII. What should the EU strategy be with 
respect to the Eurasian Economic Union 
(recommendations)
The EU and the Eurasian Economic Union are 
two very different economic and political regimes 
and systems of regulations, rules, and even values. 
These alternative integration projects differ not only 
by their standards or technical requirements, but also 
by the characteristics of their political and economic 
system: unlike the EU, the Eurasian economic area 
has particularly strong vertical politics and oligarchic 
business trends and extremely prominent political-
business nexus. Therefore, every project of economic 
integration in the post-Soviet space must be seen and 
viewed through the prism of geopolitical interests, 
as politics and economics in this space are strongly 
bound. 
The Eurasian CU in Russian foreign policy 
(specifically relations with the EU) architecture is an 
institutional instrument to control the agenda of its 
member states that have renounced their autonomy 
in external trade policies and economic relations 
with the EU. All the recent Ukrainian initiatives to 
maintain access to the CIS markets through standard 
free trade agreements that do not require a uniform 
common external tariff and therefore do not conflict 
with the country’s participation in the enhanced 
free trade regime with the EU, have been blocked by 
Russia. This means that Russia does not leave room 
for any intermediate options that would enable 
countries to combine their European orientation 
and traditional relations with the CIS countries. 
Expansion of the Eurasian CU into the European 
Neighbourhood region (i.e. membership of 
Ukraine or Moldova in the CU) can weaken EU 
regulatory power in these countries. Development 
of the Eurasian CU is a serious challenge for the EU’s 
Eastern Partnership initiative, whose main pillar is 
the access to the EU internal market through free 
trade agreements.
In other words, expansion of the Eurasian Economic 
Union to the EU Eastern Partnership countries would 
prevent the EU from applying its traditional formula 
in external relations: to expand the area of European 
regulations and rules in exchange for the opportunity 
to participate in the EU internal market. This might 
put a halt on political and economic reforms in the 
Eastern neighbourhood countries, thus leaving them 
within the post-Soviet space development trajectory 
with characteristic features of vertical politics and 
the political-business nexus. 
It is important to emphasise that the external 
tariff of the Eurasian CU (essentially reflecting 
Russia’s external tariff ) is higher than that agreed 
with the WTO by some countries of the EU Eastern 
Partnership (first of all Ukraine)83 currently seeking 
to strengthen the free trade agreement with the EU, 
which should provide for even greater reduction of 
the tariff than the WTO tariff. This indicates that the 
Eurasian CU may produce a protectionist effect 
and therefore barriers for EU products in the EU 
Eastern Partnership markets. 
The general pattern of the EU’s external relations 
is extension of European regulations and rules in 
the neighbourhood countries. However, changes to 
the EU external relations and enlargement policies 
(“enlargement fatigue”) hinder this process 84 in 
turn weakening the neighbourhood policy. The EU 
membership prospect is the cornerstone of the EU’s 
regulatory power, which can be defined as the EU’s 
ability to change the internal political and economic 
status quo of partner countries. However, the EU 
enlargement is increasingly becoming a process not 
necessarily leading to the ultimate goal – the full-
fledged EU membership. As a result a non-ending 
spiral has formed in the EU’s external relations: no EU 
membership prospect and no motivation for partner 
countries to reform (internalise the EU regulations 
and rules).85 
83 Shumylo-Tapiola Olga, “Ukraine at the Crossroads: Between 
the EU DCFTA & Customs Union”, 21–23.
84 Otto Schily, “If the EU reneges on Balkan it’s at its own peril”, 
Europe’s World, 2009, available at:
<http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/
Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21490/
language/en-US/Default.aspx>. 
85 Gabriella Meloni, “Is the same toolkit used during 
enlargement still applicable to the Countries of the New 
Neighbourhood? A problem of mismatching between 
objectives and instruments”. Presentation at the workshop 
“The European Neighbourhood Policy: A Framework for 
Modernisation?” Badia Fiesolana, 2006.
40
In the context of the “enlargement fatigue” the 
concept of integration without membership has 
been formulated, i.e. an intermediate option, which 
provides an opportunity to participate in the EU 
internal market (through enhanced free trade 
agreements) without formal membership in the EU. 
Thus today the EU seeks to expand its regulatory 
boundaries without expanding legal and institutional 
boundaries. 
Models of integration without membership 
also face challenges due to non-compliance of 
the internal status quo of partner countries with 
EU rules and standards (which is a barrier to 
their access to the EU internal market).  A partner 
country can participate in the EU internal market 
only when it adopts the EU rules and high European 
standards. EU’s focus on high standards means that 
when harmonising the regulatory framework with 
that of the EU, all costs are borne by the partner 
country (unlike in the accession negotiations in the 
EU, where part of the adaptation costs is borne by 
the EU).86 In addition, the EU standards may cause 
reduction of competitiveness of the partner country 
outside the EU and this is particularly important 
for those countries which have naturally strong 
dependency relationships with non-EU markets. 
The pressure to transpose regulations which are 
only indirectly related to trade – technical standards 
that regulateproductive activities– require increased 
investment and ultimately result in higher prices for 
consumers. This has been concluded by a variety 
of studies, including the studies conducted during 
Lithuanian EU accession. Transitional periods for the 
transposition of environmental, and other regulations 
as well as excise duties were based on this conclusion. 
Therefore, in terms of the goals of transformation and 
modernisation, it is necessary to assess the difference 
between the purchasing power of Ukraine, Moldova 
and Georgia and the EU average. The EU regulates 
product and production norms in agriculture and 
food production particularly actively which affects 
86 Anna Kolesnichenko, “Institutional Harmonization and Its 
Costs and Benefits in the Context of the EU Cooperation with 
Its Neighbours”. CASE Network Studies & Analyses, 387, 2009, 
available at: <http://www.case.com.pl/upload/publikacja_
plik/25197237_sa387.pdf>. 
the prices of food. Partly because of this, EU maintains 
high import duties on agricultural products from 
third countries and usually does not include them 
in free trade agreements. Notably, these products 
account for major portion of consumer basketsof 
less well-off households in Eastern Neighborhood 
countries. Therefore fast transposition of EU rules 
that are indirectly related to trade is not only 
expensive, but also raises the issue of social justice. 
Looking from a broader perspective, pressure for fast 
harmonisation of regulations without offering the 
benefits of membership or at least of the European 
Economic Area, might result in discouragement 
from integration in the EU. Therefore it can be 
counterproductive to the strategic objectives of the 
EU in its neighbourhood.
 
It should be noted that even adoption of EU 
regulations and standards does not yet ensure 
the access the EU internal market to the partner 
country. Certain measures of EU market protection 
may prevent offering favourable conditions for 
the partner (even if the standards are in place). 
This is very important to partner countries where the 
European internal market access is in the interest of 
influential business groups. Those business groups of 
partner countries that wish to access the EU internal 
market could potentially become driving forces for 
the country’s adaptation to EU rules and regulations, 
but due to certain protective measures may have no 
stimulus to take on such a role. 
Meanwhile, the Eurasian CU does not require 
convergence to high standards; furthermore, it may 
offer additional incentives – politically controlled 
but cheaply available credit resources and energy 
supplies at Russian domestic market prices. 
So what should the EU strategy be with 
respect to the Eurasian CU? The dynamics of the 
Eurasian Union are incompatible with the core 
principles of the EU’s external policy: the Eurasian 
CU lacks essential elements of a rules based regional 
integration project leading to the transformation of 
the economies of its member states; rather it remains 
a non-liberal project for trade simplification between 
non-liberal regimes. Development of the Eurasian 
CU has a negative impact on the EU-Russia relations 
(procrastination of negotiations on a new Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement), the EU’s leverage with 
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respect to the Belarusian regime and possibly on 
the efficiency of the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy. 
Therefore, the EU’s strategy vis-à-vis the 
Eurasian CU should be as follows: 
a) no inter-regional negotiations or other 
cooperation initiatives (in order not to legitimise 
potential power imbalances between member states 
and not to create loopholes for authoritarian regimes 
such as the one in Belarus); b) bilateral approach and 
the European Neighbourhood Policy must remain an 
unequivocal priority and cannot become hostage 
to regional integration among the three countries; 
c) regular monitoring of the development of the 
Eurasian Customs Union, support for the rule of 
law, judicial independence, political and economic 
freedoms and other elements of liberal democratic 
order, assessment as well as neutralisation of 
potential risks to the aforementioned priorities must 
be in place; and d) the EU must constantly strengthen 
visibility and accessibility of the advantages of the 
EU’s political and economic model in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood. 
This objective should be pursued in the following 
ways:  
The first thing is to understand clearly that Russia 
has initiated creation of a regional economic, and 
perhaps eventually political integration model 
which is an alternative to the EU. In this context, 
the EU must continuously enhance visibility 
and accessibility of the advantages of the EU 
political and economic model in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood. 
First, the “Russia first” principle whereby all EU 
initiatives are first implemented with Russia and 
only later become available to countries in the 
Eastern Neighbourhood must be abandoned. The 
EU will find it difficult to prove the advantages of the 
Eastern Partnership Initiative to partner countries, if 
Russia, which is not part to the EaP, gets access to 
the EU internal market (or visa-free regime) prior to 
EaP countries. This weakens the role of the EU as a 
regulatory power centre in the region. 
Second, the EU has to find a formula for how to 
reduce the cost of access of partner countries to 
the EU internal market. The EU must offer a clear 
reward to a partner country in the EU internal market 
in exchange for the adoption of European rules and 
high standards. Issues of technical standardisation 
are at the moment a serious obstacle to the exercise 
of the EU’s normative power, especially when they are 
not directly linked to trade and rather have to do with 
production processes and other business activities. 
The EU should show understanding and sensitivity 
to the challenges of regulatory approximation, 
especially when they lead to the increase of product 
prices and might be important for the consumers 
with considerably smaller purchasing power than 
in the EU. Otherwise either the EU norms might be 
legally adopted but left unimplemented, incentives 
for shadow activities might increase or these 
countries might find the regulatory environment 
of the Eurasian Union more attractive due to lower 
adjustment costs. The DCFTA process is crucial along 
with further tangible deliverables to increase cost-
effectiveness of EU orientated market liberalisation 
to Ukraine and other EaP countries. 
Third, the EU must learn to offer incentives to 
major business structures of partner countries 
interested in accession to the EU markets. These 
structures can become “locomotives” of the partner 
country’s EU integration. In other words, the EU tariff 
reduction scheme and export quotas offered to its 
partner countries must respond to the interests of 
major business groups operating in the country. This 
could be an incentive for them to take on the role of 
an engine of Europeanisation. 
Fourth, the EU must upgrade its tools in the 
Eastern Partnership operation field to effect on 
strategic sectors of the economy – particularly 
on energy and transport policies. Extension of the 
Connecting Europe Facility to embrace Eastern 
Partnership could be an option. This would allow 
the EU to directly participate in the development 
of the energy and transport infrastructure of the 
Eastern Neighbourhood countries, which has a 
significant impact on the geopolitical gravity of 
these countries. 
Conclusions and recommendations for
further research
The Eastern Partnership and related partnership 
agreements cover not only the harmonisation of 
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technical regulations by adopting EU rules, but also 
extend to implementation of the principles of a 
democratic political system. The EU is interested 
in maintaining the incentive of EU integration for 
Eastern Partnership countries in order to expand 
the space of free society, governance based on 
the rule of law, and a liberal economy. 
The best scenario in terms of the development 
of trade relations and mutual benefit would be the 
liberalisation of trade between the EU, the Eastern 
Partnership countries and the Eurasian Union and 
reciprocal removal of customs duties on trade. 
However, such a scenario is very unlikely due to 
Russia’s inability to develop a binding contractual 
relationship with the EU, the influence of interest 
groups, different political and geopolitical 
objectives associated with trade liberalisation 
and the great importance of non-tariff barriers to 
trade. Such a free trade area would be fragmented 
and limited to certain products that may be of no 
interest to either party. 
Since removal of non-tariff barriers related to the 
adoption or recognition of EU regulations in the 
Eurasian countries is either highly unlikely or will be 
slow and selective, the Eastern Partnership countries 
will have to choose between the regulatory spaces 
of the EU or the Eurasian Union. Membership in 
the Eurasian Union would mean lower short-term 
adjustment costs for businesses, but integration into 
the EU would have greater economic development 
potential. 
The attractiveness of the EU to Eastern Partnership 
countries has been diminished by the prolonged crisis 
in the Eurozone countries, which Russia employs to 
strengthen its positions. The relationship between 
Eastern Partnership policy and the Eurozone crisis is 
indirect and rather distant, but leaders of Lithuania 
and other EU countries should bear in mind that 
structural reforms and other measures to enhance 
competitiveness and economic development would 
have not only a direct positive effect on the EU and its 
Member States, but would also strengthen the EU’s 
power of attraction and the appeal of integration. 
The revision of EU regulations in order to simplify 
them and reduce administrative burdens for 
business, which the European Commission has 
launched within the framework of the Lisbon 
Strategy, would be beneficial, but in recent years 
this has been given little attention.  
So far, many of the elements of the Eurasian 
Economic Union are in an early or preparatory stage 
of implementation, therefore it is imperative to 
assess the conditions for realisation of these 
plans, potential risks for the implementation of 
the planned integration measures, and possible 
implications for the EU and Lithuania in greater 
detail in the future. Further research in the following 
areas would be most relevant to Lithuania and EU: 
•	 Outlines of energy policy coordination within 
the Eurasian Union and its compatibility with 
EU interests.
•	 Free movement of labour in the Eurasian 
Union, security implications in the region and 
EU-Russia visa dialogue. 
•	 The Eurasian CU transport policy – implications 
for Lithuania and the Baltic Sea region.
•	 Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan – business 
interests beyond the Eurasian Union project.
•	 Ukrainian business elites and the EU (a 
bottom-up evaluation of interests of Ukrainian 
business groups and their expectations with 
respect to the EU integration). 
•	 Eurasian Economic Union – are Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan potential newcomers? (These 
countries have been particularly actively 
“invited” recently, in the case of Kyrgyzstan, 
an accession action plan has been prepared). 
Why the EU cannot officially recognise the 
Eurasian Economic Union:
 
Valid Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
between the members of the Eurasian Union and the 
EU, as well as WTO membership must be essential 
prerequisites for recognition of the Eurasian Union.
Recognition of the Eurasian Union from Russia’s 
point of view basically means rejecting the EU-
Russia negotiations on the post-PCA agreement 
and replacing them with the EU’s negotiations 
with the Eurasian Economic Union. However, the 
inter-regional agreements are not a substitute for 
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partnership and cooperation agreements.87 Russia’s 
expectations that the negotiations between the 
EU and the Eurasian Union will be limited to 
commercial elements, leaving out the issues of the 
rule of law, political reforms and human rights in 
all three countries have no grounds. At the political 
level such expectations have been rejected by the 
European Parliament resolution of 13 December 
2012 containing the European Parliament’s 
recommendations to the Council, the Commission 
and the European External Action Service on the 
negotiations of the new EU-Russia Agreement 
(2011/2050 (INI)), which prioritises obligations 
of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
and WTO membership over any other agreements 
and sets forth the necessity to ensure not only 
economic, but also political modernisation as a 
precondition for these agreements.88 Cooperation 
or negotiations between the EU and the Eurasian 
87 Partnership and Cooperation Agreements is the format of 
EU relations in the Eastern Neighbourhood. Furthermore, 
all members states of Mercosur have framework partnership 
agreements with the EU, which set forth the foundation for 
democratic cooperation, respect for human rights and other 
political principles (except for Venezuela, whose membership 
in Mercosur has essentially become the end-point of the 
Mercosur-EU negotiations on regional free trade agreement). 
88 The European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2012 
containing the European Parliament’s recommendations 
to the Council, the Commission and the European External 
Action Service on the negotiations of the new EU-Russia 
Agreement (2011/2050 (INI)): “Regarding the issue of 
economic cooperation, to insist on a bilateral agreement 
between the EU and Russia, while making it clear that the 
possibility of an agreement between the EU and the Russian-
led Customs Union can be envisaged only in the long run 
and once the bilateral agreement has entered into force”; 
“to encourage our Russian counterparts to manifest a clear 
political will to reach an agreement on legally binding 
‘trade and investment’ provisions, which should be based 
on the provisions already included in the PCA and should 
be compatible with WTO accession; recall that the EU’s 
objective in this area is to improve and stabilise the business 
environment, since this would be beneficial to both parties and 
would further promote the objectives set by the Partnership 
for Modernisation launched in 2010”; “the EU continues to be 
committed to further deepening and developing its relations 
with Russia, and to the principles enshrined in the Partnership 
for Modernisation, which are based on common interests 
and a deep commitment to universal values and democratic 
principles, respect for fundamental human rights, and the 
rule of law”.
Union may become possible only when all countries of 
the Eurasian Union have concluded valid Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreements with the EU. 
Similarly, in terms of a stable trade regime, 
negotiations between the EU and the Eurasian Union 
are possible only when all members of the Eurasian 
Union become WTO members. Otherwise, Russia, 
which has completed its WTO accession negotiations, 
indirectly, gets an opportunity to renegotiate the 
terms at the expense of other members of the 
Eurasian Union; in addition, only membership in the 
WTO (and, ideally, the end of transition periods) can 
ensure a more transparent settlement of disputes 
between the otherwise non-liberal political and 
economic regimes and with them. Otherwise, a 
dilemma will inevitably arise in relations with the EU 
due to the different WTO status of the three members 
of the Eurasian Union. Ignoring these differences 
could lead to the legitimisation of the Belarusian 
regime (may provide conditions for Belarusian entry 
to the EU’s internal market through the “back door”) 
and further reduce potential measures directed 
against the regime. The EU also needs a clearer action 
strategy concerning Russia’s protectionist measures 
and ignoring of WTO rules. 
Deepening of Eurasian Union integration 
(free movement of labour) and the visa dialogue 
with the EU: risks to the European Union. Russia 
has visa-free travel arrangements with most CIS 
countries (with high indicators of both economic 
migrants and political refugees). According to 
the current regulation, a person can become a 
naturalised citizen of Russian Federation after 
three years of marriage to a citizen of Russia, after 
passing the Russian language and constitution 
examinations, on the condition of having a 
legitimate income; it is not necessary to live in 
Russia permanently for five years. This has certain 
implications to the EU-Russia visa dialogue in the 
light of an open Eurasian labour market. The EU 
should pay attention to the scenario of Russia as a 
possible intermediate stop for migrants of other CIS 
countries to the EU. The experience of the Balkan 
countries, specifically with Turkish migrants to the 
EU attests to this, as Turkey has a visa-free regime 
with the Balkan countries. In addition by creating 
the Eurasian Economic Area, which includes Russia, 
Belarus and Kazakhstan, a common visa policy will 
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also be sought. Thus, the internal border controls 
will be abolished. For these reasons, the risk of 
illegal migration may increase at the EU external 
borders. In order to mitigate possible risks of illegal 
migration, the EU could raise (as a condition in the 
negotiations with Russia on a visa-free regime) the 
necessity to conclude readmission agreements 
with all countries of the Eurasian Customs Union. 
Given the functions delegated to the Eurasian 
Union, and the negotiations with Russia on a visa-
free regime, a connection between the entrance 
of the visa-free regime in force and the conclusion 
of the readmission agreement with Belarus (and 
other countries of the Eurasian Economic Union) 
should be made.
Creation of the Eurasian Union (and any other 
economic regional bloc for that matter) should in 
theory be an economically viable internal process 
among the three countries – Russia, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan. This is, however, not the case – it is 
counterproductive with respect to Kazakhstan’s 
negotiations on accession to the WTO and the 
general liberalisation trends in the region. The 
Eurasian CU may in fact produce a protectionist 
effect and therefore barriers for EU products in the 
EU Eastern Partnership markets. 
It is necessary to take the EU’s strategy in the 
Eastern Neighbourhood into account. Recognition 
of Eurasian Union by opening negotiations or any 
other formal interaction before making further 
decisions on Belarus would essentially mean loss 
of any independent EU strategy towards Alexander 
Lukashenka’s regime, passing all economic 
instruments in the hands of the Eurasian Union. 
In addition, recognition of the Eurasian Union and 
negotiations with it would provide premises for the 
Belarusian regime to renew relationship with the EU 
through the “back door”. 
The same applies to the Eastern Partnership 
Initiative – as long as the EU itself has not 
answered the question as to “what is next?” after 
the implementation of the DCFTA and the visa 
dialogues, dialogue with the Eurasian Union would 
lead to further confusion in the regional dynamics. 
Ukraine, Moldova and other Eastern Neighbourhood 
countries must see a clear EU position – EaP is a clear 
priority and greater convergence with the EU is only 
possible through the European Neighbourhood 
Policy and the contractual relations with the EU.
In this light, it is crucial that political or technical 
cooperation with the Eurasian Union as an 
organisation (by EU member states or EU institutions, 
e. g. directorates of the European Commission, 
etc.) are properly monitored and kept down to 
the minimum required for the dissemination of 
principles and norms which are the basis of the EU 
law. The EU’s position must be unified and coherent 
– the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and 
WTO membership are necessary preconditions to  any 
dialogue – political and technical.
The following dimensions of the Eurasian Union, 
which have not yet been clearly defined, should 
be closely monitored: energy policy coordination, 
free movement of labour, and transport policy. 
Development of these policies will inevitably have 
implications for the region, and the EU’s energy and 
economic interests. 
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Bodies of the Customs Union (CU) and the Eurasian Economic Union
Defines the strategy 
and the objectives of 
further development of 
the CU and the  Eurasian 
Economic Union  
The Common 
permanent regulatory 
body of the CU and 
the  Eurasian Economic 
Union  
Ensures functioning of 
the CU and the Eurasian 
Economic Union and  
provides proposals 
on further economic 
development 
Eurasian Economic Commission 
(the Commission) 
Council of the Commission:
3 Members of the Council 
Board of the Commission:
Chairperson & 8 Members of the Board 
Supreme Eurasian Economic Council
-level of heads of states/presidents
-level of prime ministers
Missions of the  Eurasian Economic Commission in the CU member 
states, third countries
and at the international organisations
(established by the decision of the Eurasian Economic Council)
EurAsEC
Court
Structural 
units of the 
Commission
Departments of 
the Commission
Consulting 
bodies of the 
Commission
Ensures cooperation 
with national 
authorities
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Tatiana
Valovaya
Member of the Board-
Minister in charge 
of development 
of integration and 
macroeconomics
Valery
Koreshkov
Member of the Board-
Minister in charge of 
technical regulation
Andrey
Slepnev
Member of Board-
Minister in charge 
of trade
Danial
Akhmetov
Member of the Board-
Minister in charge of 
energy and infrastructure
Sergey
Sidorsky
Member of the Board-
Minister in charge of 
industry and agriculture
Nurlan
Aldabergenov
Member of the Board-
Minister in charge of 
competition
Vladimir
Goshin
Member of Board-
Minister in charge 
of customs 
cooperation
Timur
Suleimenov
Member of the Board-
Minister in charge of 
economics and financial 
policy
Board of the Commission
Chairman of the Board
Viktor Khristenko 
Eurasian Economic Commission
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Decision making process within the CU and the Eurasian Economic Union
Supreme Eurasian
Economic  Council
Council of the Commission 
Board of the Commission 
he Supreme Council takes a decision on the issue Council
The Council takes decisions on issues within its competency 
The Board takes decisions on issues within its competence 
N
at
io
na
l  
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s2. CU member states 
analyse the issue 
and provide their 
comments
3. The issue is submitted to the Board
Consulting bodies of the 
Commission 
Departments of the Commission 
Decisions  are 
announced (on 
the internet) 
and become an 
integral part of 
the legal base of 
the CU 
1. Departments  analyse proposals
4. The issue is submitted to the Council of the Commission
5. The issue is submitted to the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council 
(which operates on the level of presidents/prime ministers)
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Composition of the Board of the
Eurasian Economic Commission and
allocation of functions:
•	 Viktor Khristenko (representative of 
Russia), EEC Chairman of the Board. Carries 
out general coordination of the activities of the 
Board; ensures implementation of activities 
related to the financial, legal, and personnel 
matters of the Board; co-ordinates and 
controls compatibility of the main directions 
of integration; ensures the preparation and 
conducting of the meetings of the Supreme 
Eurasian Economic Council and the EEC 
Council; prepares the budget of the Council 
and monitors its implementation; and ensures 
the supply and provision of information 
necessary for the activities of the Board.
•	 Tatiana Valovaya (representative of Russia), 
member of the Board (Minister) in charge 
of the main directions of integration and 
macroeconomics. Main functions: integration 
policy; codification of the contractual-legal 
base of the customs union and the Eurasian 
Economic Union; macroeconomic issues, in-
cluding matters related to the fundamental 
issues of economic development and coordi-
nation of the countries’ macro-economic poli-
cies; monitoring and analysis of the countries’ 
economic development situation; statistics.
•	 Andrej Slepnev (representative of Russia), 
member of the Board (Minister) in charge 
of trade. Main functions: tariff and non-tariff 
regulation; implementation of the single cus-
toms nomenclature for goods; market protec-
tion instruments (anti-dumping, application 
of countervailing/anti-subsidy and protection-
ist/security measures); unification of trade 
regimes and conclusion of free trade agree-
ments with third countries; strategic goods 
and technology export control.
•	 Vladimir Goshin (representative of 
Belarus), member of the Board (Minister) 
in charge of customs cooperation. Main 
functions: customs legislation and practical 
implementation; implementation of 
customs procedures and customs controls; 
development of customs infrastructure and 
IT installation for customs.
•	 Valery Koreshkov (representative of 
Belarus), member of the Board (Minister) in 
charge of standards/technical regulations. 
Main functions: technical regulations; 
accreditation; sanitary, veterinary and phyto-
sanitary measures.
•	 Sergey Sidorsky (representative of Belarus), 
member of the Board (Minister) in charge 
of industry and agriculture. Main functions: 
industrial development policy; agricultural 
policy; cross-border programmes and projects; 
industrial and agricultural subsidies.
•	 Timur Suleimenov (representative of 
Kazakhstan), member of the Board 
(Minister) in charge of economics and 
financial policy. Main functions: regulation 
of conditions for business and investment; tax 
policy; collection and distribution of duties; 
financial markets; monetary policy; banking 
and insurance services sector; stock market; 
protection of intellectual property; labour 
migration.
•	 Danial Achmetov (representative of 
Kazakhstan), member of the Board 
(Minister) in charge of energy and 
infrastructure. Main functions: energy 
policy; natural monopolies; transport and 
transportation, including issues related 
to rail services and regulation policy of 
transportation tariffs; general infrastructure.
•	 Nurlan Aldabergenov (representative 
of Kazakhstan), member of the Board 
(Minister) in charge of competition. Main 
functions: competition policy and assurance 
of common competition conditions; sanctions 
and penalties for violations of competition; 
introduction of state price regulation and 
control; procurement by state and local 
governments, including uniform procurement 
rules and cancellation of the national public 
procurement regime; investigation of 
infringement of public procurement rules 
and procedures.
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SUMMARY
Theoretically, liberalisation of trade between the 
EU and the Eastern Partnership countries as well as 
across the emerging Eurasian Economic Union, by 
removing customs duties on trade, would be ben-
eficial both to the EU and Lithuania. However, such 
a scenario is very unlikely due to Russia’s inability to 
develop a binding contractual relationship with the 
EU, the influence of interest groups, different politi-
cal and geopolitical objectives associated with trade 
liberalisation and the great importance of non-tariff 
barriers to trade. Such a free trade area would be 
fragmented and limited to certain products that may 
be of no interest to either party. Despite the rheto-
ric of Russian leaders about the pan-European 
economic space, Eurasian Customs Union (CU) 
and a broader free trade neighbourhood with 
the EU remain incompatible, first of all due to 
regulatory differences, and cannot be regarded 
as complementary. Given the current dynamics 
the Eurasian CU may in fact produce a protection-
ist effect and therefore barriers for EU products 
in the EU Eastern Partnership markets. This gives 
rise to the current dilemma of the countries of 
the Eastern Partnership on whether to choose 
integration into the EU or a closer relationship 
with the Eurasian Union and eventual member-
ship in it. 
The nature of integration of the Eurasian Union 
forces Eastern Partnership countries to choose 
between the regulatory areas of the EU or the 
Eurasian Union. Membership in the Eurasian Un-
ion would mean lower short-term regulatory adjust-
ment costs for businesses, but integration into the 
EU would have greater economic development po-
tential (EU’s GDP at purchasing power parity is 5.67 
times that of the Eurasian Union).The Eurasian Union 
project is associated not only with competition in 
the Eastern Neighbourhood. Cooperation between 
the EU and the Eurasian Union from Russia’s point 
of view should replace the EU-Russia negotiations 
on the post-PCA agreement (accordingly refusing all 
elements related to democratisation, reforms in the 
energy sector and economics, and human rights).
The Eurasian Customs Union in Russia’s foreign 
policy architecture is an institutional instrument to 
control its member states external trade agenda and 
relations with the EU. All the recent Ukrainian initia-
tives to maintain access to the CIS markets through 
standard free trade agreements that do not require 
uniform common external tariff and therefore do 
not conflict with the country’s participation in the 
enhanced free trade regime with the EU, have been 
blocked by Russia. This means that Russia does not 
leave room for any intermediate options that would 
enable countries to combine their European orien-
tation and natural economic relationship with the 
CIS countries.
Therefore, it can be said that expansion of the 
Eurasian CU to the EU neighbourhood region (for 
instance membership of Ukraine or Moldova in the 
CU) is a serious challenge to the EU’s Eastern Part-
nership initiative whose main pillar is access to the 
EU internal market through free trade agreements. 
Key challenge to fundamental EU policies in the 
Eastern neighbourhood: as countries join the Eura-
sian CU, they lose independence in external trade 
policy. CU member states must not only agree on 
a common customs tariff, but also develop joint a 
trade regime with third countries. Given the char-
acteristics of the Eurasian institutions, in order to 
pass a decision or seek to develop a more favourable 
trade regime with the EU for any member of the CU, 
Russia’s approval is required. Thus, Russia gains lever-
age to control external trade policies of CU countries 
and their relations with the EU, for example, to block 
negotiations with the EU on an enhanced free trade 
agreement.
Furthermore, the aim of the ongoing integration 
process of the Eurasian Union is not only economic, 
but also political integration. While the limits of the 
potential political integration are not yet clear, efforts 
of both the representatives of Russia and the EEC 
to achieve and consolidate political recognition of 
the emerging structure have become more intense.
Ukraine is the most important target for the de-
velopment of the Eurasian Economic Union. In the 
current situation, “freezing” of the enhanced free 
trade agreement, its association with political re-
quirements in the field of the rule of law on the EU 
side, and incentives offered to Ukraine by the Eura-
sian CU (more precisely – Russia) may make Kiev opt 
for the alternative integration project.
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What should the EU strategy be with respect 
to the Eurasian CU? The dynamics of the Eurasian 
Union is counter productive with respect to princi-
ples of the EU’s external policy: the Eurasian CU lacks 
essential elements of a rules based regional integra-
tion project leading to transformation of economies 
of its member states; rather it remains a non-liberal 
project for trade simplification between non-liberal 
regimes. This makes the question of independent de-
cision making very sensitive.  None of the countries 
of Eurasian Union can be attributed to a free society, 
which means there is absence of the rule of law and 
fair trials. These attributes extend inevitably to the 
regional structure. Besides the “democracy deficit” 
and power asymmetries within the Eurasian union 
as an organisation, it is very much a union of non-
democratic regimes.
Development of the Eurasian CU has a negative 
impact on the advance of EU-Russia relations 
(procrastination of negotiations on a new Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement), the EU’s leverage with 
respect to the Belarusian regime and possibly on 
the efficiency of the EU’s Eastern Partnership policy. 
Therefore, the EU’s strategy vis-à-vis the 
Eurasian CU should be as follows: a) no inter-
regional negotiations or other cooperation 
initiatives (in order not to legitimise potential 
power imbalances between member states and 
not to create loopholes for authoritarian regimes 
such as the one in Belarus); b) bilateral approach 
and the European Neighbourhood Policy must 
remain an unequivocal priority and cannot 
become hostage to regional integration among 
the three countries; c) regular monitoring of the 
development of the Eurasian Customs Union, 
support for the rule of law, judicial independence, 
political and economic freedoms and other 
elements of liberal democratic order, assessment 
as well as neutralisation of potential risks to the 
aforementioned priorities must be in place; and 
d) the EU must constantly strengthen visibility 
and accessibility of the advantages of the EU’s 
political and economic model in the Eastern 
Neighbourhood. This objective should be pursued 
in the following ways.
First, the EU has to find a formula for how to 
reduce the cost of access of partner countries to 
the EU internal market. The EU must offer a clear 
reward to a partner country in the EU internal market 
in exchange for the adoption of European rules and 
high standards. Issues of technical standardisation 
are at the moment a serious obstacle to the exercise 
of the EU’s normative power, especially when they are 
not directly linked to trade and rather have to do with 
production processes and other business activities. 
The EU should show understanding and sensitivity 
to the challenges of regulatory approximation, 
especially when they lead to the increase of product 
prices and might be important for the consumers 
with considerably smaller purchasing power than 
in the EU. Otherwise either the EU norms might be 
legally adopted but left unimplemented, incentives 
for shadow activities might increase or these 
countries might find the regulatory environment 
of the Eurasian Union more attractive due to lower 
adjustment costs. The DC-FTA process is crucial along 
with further tangible deliverables to increase cost-
effectiveness of EU orientated market liberalisation 
to Ukraine and other EaP countries. 
Second, the EU must learn to offer incentives 
to major business structures of partner countries 
interested in accession to the EU markets. These 
structures can become “locomotives” of the partner 
country’s integration in the EU. In other words, the EU 
tariff reduction scheme and export quotas offered to 
its partner countries must respond to the interests 
of major business groups operating in the country 
and better use of competitive advantages of these 
economies.
Why cannot the EU officially recognise the 
Eurasian Economic Union?
Valid Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
between the members of the Eurasian Union 
and the EU, as well as WTO membership must 
be essential prerequisites for recognition of the 
Eurasian Union.
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Inter-regional agreements are not a substitute 
for partnership and cooperation agreements.1 
Russia’s expectations that the negotiations between 
the EU and the Eurasian Union will be limited to 
commercial elements, leaving out the issues of the 
rule of law, political reforms and human rights in all 
three countries have no grounds. 2  Cooperation or 
negotiations between the EU and the Eurasian 
Union may become possible only when all 
countries of the Eurasian Union have concluded 
valid Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
with the EU (like other eastern EU neighbours). 
Similarly, in terms of a stable trade regime, 
negotiations between the EU and the Eurasian 
Union are possible only when all members of the 
Eurasian Union become WTO members. Otherwise, 
Russia, which has completed its WTO accession 
negotiations, indirectly, gets an opportunity to 
renegotiate the terms at the expense of other 
members of the Eurasian Union. In addition, only 
membership in the WTO (and, ideally, the end of 
transition periods) can ensure a more transparent 
settlement of disputes between the otherwise non-
liberal political and economic regimes and with them. 
Considering the issue of recognition of the 
Eurasian Union, the following aspects must be 
considered:
•	 Deepening of Eurasian Union integration 
(free movement of labour) and the 
1 Partnership and Cooperation Agreements is the format of 
EU relations in the Eastern Neighbourhood. For comparison 
– all members states of Mercosur have framework partnership 
agreements with the EU, which set forth the foundation for 
democratic cooperation, respect for human rights and other 
political principles (except for Venezuela, whose membership 
in Mercosur has essentially become the end-point of the 
Mercosur-EU negotiations on regional free trade agreement). 
2 The European Parliament resolution of 13 December 2012 
containing the European Parliament’s recommendations 
to the Council, the Commission and the European External 
Action Service on the negotiations of the new EU-Russia 
Agreement (2011/2050 (INI)) prioritises obligations of the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and the WTO 
membership over any other agreements and sets forth the 
necessity to ensure not only economic, but also political 
modernisation as a precondition for these obligations.
visa dialogue with the EU: risks to the 
European Union. Russia has visa-free travel 
arrangements with most CIS countries (with 
high indicators of both economic migrants 
and political refugees). According to the 
current regulation, a person can become 
a naturalised citizen of Russian Federation 
after three years of marriage to a citizen of 
Russia, after passing the Russian language 
and constitution examinations, on the 
condition of having a legitimate income; it is 
not necessary to live in Russia permanently 
for five years. This has certain implications to 
the EU-Russia visa dialogue in the light of an 
open Eurasian labour market. The EU should 
pay attention to the scenario of Russia as a 
possible intermediate stop for migrants of 
other CIS countries to the EU. The experience 
of the Balkan countries, specifically with 
Turkish migrants to the EU attests to this, as 
Turkey has a visa-free regime with the Balkan 
countries. In addition by creating the Eurasian 
Economic Area, which includes Russia, Belarus 
and Kazakhstan, a common visa policy will 
also be sought. Thus, the internal border 
controls will be abolished. For these reasons, 
the risk of illegal migration may increase at 
the EU external borders. In order to mitigate 
possible risks of illegal migration, the EU could 
raise (as a condition in the negotiations with 
Russia on a visa-free regime) the necessity 
to conclude readmission agreements with 
all countries of the Eurasian Customs Union. 
Given the functions delegated to the Eurasian 
Union, and the negotiations with Russia on a 
visa-free regime, a connection between the 
entrance of the visa-free regime in force and 
the conclusion of the readmission agreement 
with Belarus (and other countries of the 
Eurasian Economic Union) should be made.
•	 Creation of the Eurasian Union is not an 
economically viable internal process. It 
is counter productive with respect to 
Kazakhstan’s negotiations on accession to 
the WTO and the general liberalisation trends 
in the region. The Eurasian CU may in fact 
produce a protectionist effect and therefore 
barriers for EU products in the EU Eastern 
Partnership markets. 
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•	 It is necessary to take the EU’s strategy 
in the Eastern Neighbourhood into 
account. Recognition of Eurasian Union by 
opening negotiations or any other formal 
interaction before making further decisions 
on Belarus would essentially mean loss of any 
independent EU strategy towards Alexander 
Lukashenka’s regime, passing all economic 
instruments in the hands of the Eurasian 
Union. In addition, recognition of the Eurasian 
Union and negotiations with it would provide 
premises for the Belarusian regime to renew 
relationship with the EU through the “back 
door”. 
•	 The same applies to the Eastern Partnership 
Initiative – as long as the EU itself has not 
answered the question as to “what is next?” 
after the implementation of the DC-FTA 
and the visa dialogues, dialogue with 
the Eurasian Union would lead to further 
confusion in the regional dynamics. Ukraine, 
Moldova and other Eastern Neighbourhood 
countries must see a clear EU position – EaP is 
a clear priority and greater convergence with 
the EU is only possible through the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and the contractual 
relations with the EU.
•	 In this light, it is crucial that political or 
technical cooperation with the Eurasian 
Union as an organisation (by EU member 
states or EU institutions, e. g. directorates of 
the European Commission, etc.) are properly 
monitored and kept down to the minimum 
required for the dissemination of principles 
and norms which are the basis of the EU 
law. The EU’s position must be unified and 
coherent – the Partnership and Cooperation 
Agreement and WTO membership are 
necessary preconditions to or any dialogue 
– political and technical.

